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ABSTRAαr

After r‘ 1s1ng

t。

a

position of political and ecoν

nom1c importance among the Latin American republics of
the nineteenth century , Chile lost that leadership 1n
the early 1900 ’ s , much to the consternation
leading statesmen and intellectuals.

。f

her

The econom1c dis-

location following World War I exacerbated the already
며

ser10us social conditions , while at the same time the
---I
trad itionally p‘ ” R v e lower classes started to demand
>

a voice 1n the management of their’ own affairs.

The

less to solve the
at every turn.

n
r
r

esR
>

·빽

existinggovernmental system had proved itself powerproblems facing the country

Chile desperately needed new leadership;

the time was perfect for the emergence of a modernstyle caudillo.

As early as 1918 , Arturo Alessandri

was prominently mentioned as a.likely candidate for the
μHe

had established his charismatic quali-

a --‘a n for
σ

ties and his political prowess 1n his 1915 c

때

Presidency.

마

바

the Senate seat for Tarapaca , and 1n the short span of
”
four’ years he became the p‘ m ”
choice for the highi

est
。f

。 ffice.

Alessandri won nomination as the candidate

the Liberal Alliance coalition

10

1920 , and he was

electedPresident by such a slim marg1n that the contest

아원톨톨

‘
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His triumph

had to be decided by a Tribunal of Honor.

made him Chile ’ S first middle-class chief executive-;‘-,‘,,,‘,‘‘i,‘

••
,tIi

a victory for the middle sectors that voted for him and
the lower classes that threatened revolution if he were
denied the office.

The magnitude of his

W1n

must be

qualified , however , for‘ the oligarchy was aware that
without control of Congress Alessandri would be unable
to effect even moderate reforms.

He had promised to

right all the things that were

wrong

S 。

10

Chile but

such promises were not to be fulfilled.
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AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE
,He was the

grandS。 n

。:E

an Italian juggler who

traveled .to Chile with a group of entertainers and stayed
to become the Kingdom of Italy ’ s first accredited diplomat
to the Santiago government.

He was the son of a gentleman

farmer whoacquired connections amongthe local aristocrats
but who never succeeded in becoming one of them.

He was a

lawyer who won election to the Chamber of Deputies at the
age of twenty-nine , and became the youngest man in the
nation ’ s history to hold· a cabinet post.
Arturo Alessandri Palma was inaugurated as President
。f

the Republic of Chile in December , 1920 , the first

TTpOpU~

lar" candidate to be elected to the highest office and the
first chief executive of middle class immigrant background.
His victoryclimaxed a violent political struggle which , in
the midst of economic distress and social unrest , brought
the country to the brink of revo·lution.

To Alessandri ,

called the "Lion of Tarapaca , fT must go some of the cred it
and much of the blame for the nature of Chilean development
in the twentieth century.
4
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I.

THE CHILEAN POLITICAL SETTING

During mostof the nineteenth century the Republic
。f

Chile was regarded as a model for stable and enlightened

government in Latin America.

Its system of political parties

dates back to183l , and the practice of orderly transfer of
public office was firmly established shortly thereafter.
TheChilean oligarchy accepted the principle that' the opposition was entitled to a voice in government; and while
honest'elections were rare , at least members of the opposition could be seated if they managed to overcome official
control of the electoral machinery.

After 1870 , three or

more parties were regularly represented in Congress , thus
minority factions were able to maintain continuity between
presidential campaigns.

A party ’ s doctrine was more impor-

tant than its candidate--in·Latin America an attitude
uniquely Chilean--and partly because of that attitude , Chile
escaped the

~yils

of personalism and caud ill ismo so preva-

lent in the neighboring

republics~

Yet the President , in

practice , constituted an almost invincibleauthority who
directed the ?dministration of the country , influenced congressional elections , and designated his own

릅 uccessor.

Domination by the executive extended over the courts , the
armedforces , and the provincial governorsand intendants;

,
,‘r
r
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and it was in no way curtailed while the Conservative Party
remained in power.

With the ascendancy of the Liberals at

mid-century came gradual constitutional reforms which
weakened somewhat the control exercised by the President ,
but he still retained the prime power of intervention in
local governmentaffairs.
Chilefought a major war against Peru and Bolivia
in the years 1879 to1883 , acquiring additional territory ,
a strengthened economy , and a new set of problems.
25 , 000 mestizo nitrate workers had .to be

Almost

incorporat~d int 。

the labor force of the north , and Chileansclosed their
eyes to theexploitation of those "inferior foreigners."
The expanded frontiers required more effective

defens~

measures , which onthe one hand led to the professionalization and Prussianization of the army , and on the other
fostered suspicion and mistrust in civilian sectors.
Furthermore '" significant shifts in the power
structure had occurred--economic and social as well as
political--and the upper"classes were able to challenge
the previously uncontested executive authority.

In 1890

the Liberal Party , with a formidable majority in Congress ,
dared to resist President Balmaceda andto lead the movement in support of a parliamentary form of government.
The Liberals also renewed the struggle for the old

i‘

μ

principle of electoral liberty.l

Events reached a climax

the following year when revolution toppled not only a president , but presidential dominance as well; the entire system
collapsed.
Under the new regime , the President was to govern
in accord with the parliamentary majority , and he was
required to submit all his acts to the scrutiny of Congress.
The composition of the majority varied greatly , depending
。n

the particular circumstances , and any splinter group

mighttopple a ministryby withdrawing its support of the
dominant coalition.

During the thirty-three year exist-

ence of the Parliamentary Period , the instability of ministries _reached epidemic proportions:

121 cabinet changes

involvingthe incredible total of 530 ministers. 2

Most

representative of political parties were the Democratic
Liberals who , according to Fredrick B. Pike , "stand as a
symbol of Chilean politics during the era.

They were ready

to combine with any and all al l. iances and coalitions , or
to leave them just as casually , provided political expedi•

ency so d ieta.ted ."
E’。r

more.than.a.quarter.of.a.century , Chile wallowed

tAt that time the Liberals were profiting from the
practice'of electoral intervention , though many opposed it
on moral grounds.

~~ce0I.:di~~ to of~i~~al ~en~te .f_~gure~ cit~<:1 by
Alberto EdwardsVives and Eduardo Frei Montalva. Historia de
L으E pa~tidos pol{ticos chilenos , p. 13니.

*톨"""'-
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in pOlitical sterility under a cloak of outward stability.
There was little chance for even the most dedicated leaders
to plan and carry out

progr~ms

of national development; for

yesterday ’ s ally might be tomorrow ’ s
faction had an effective veto. 3

~oe ，

and each party

Abuse of the Congressional

power to interpellate and censure Ministers , coupled with
irresponsible delay in passing appropriations bills-fiscal blackmail , servedeffectively to neutralize what
little executive authority remained.
dition , Presidents

략브

In the Chilean tra-

succeed one another according

t。

the provisions of the Constitution; and though that fact
is notable , it hardly constitutes a ringing endorsement
。f

the system.

Civil liberties of the middle and upper

classes were respected , freedom of the press was maintained , some improvements in communications and in education were evident , and the personal integrity of the
numerouscabinetmemberswas creditable.μ The two most
3F’redrick B. Pike , Chile 삶ld 효브르 United States ,
1880-1962: The Emergence of Chile ’ s Social Crisis and the
Challenge 죠으 United States Diplomacy , pp. 87-8.

μCorruption and bribery within the bureaucracy havebeen noted by most writers on Chilean politics. The law of
1892 providing autonomy for municipalities was supposed t 。
facilitate higher standards of government on the local level ,
but generally it hadthe opposite effect. Vote buying was
an accepted procedure that developed with the shift of lower
class population to the cities .. The oligarchy determined
that t h.e only way to render the masses politically harmless
wasto pa~ them to vote for the right candidates; one ’ s vote
came to be considered property which could be sold to the
highest bidder.

6

discussed issues of the period were the stabilization of the
currency to slow the rampant inflation , and the expansion of
education under the control of the
Church.

Stat~

instead of the

However , years of debating produced no decisions;

the Chur’ch-State issue was not resolved until 1925 , and the
economic dislocation resulting from World War I made impossible a return to the gold standard , so Chile continued her
loveaffair with paper money.

While senator’ s and deputies

engaged in histrionics and Presidents passed through

관르

Moneda , the nation ’ s social problems were growing acute.
Unrest and violence were not confined to the
nitrate fields of the Atacama region , but became prevalent
in the coal mines of the south as well.

The rural labor

force , predominantly mestizo , had existed in a "semi-feudal"
society until many of the landed aristocracy lost their
holdings around the turn of the century.

Then the rural

masses , uneducat'ed and unskilled , migrated to the towns and
. cities , swelling theranks of the urban unemployed; and this
oversupplyo f. brute labor only postponed the desperately
needed improvements in working conditions and wages.
。rganizations

Labor

developed slowly and protest meetings and

demonstrations were ruthlessly suppressed with force. 5
5The first serious labor movement began in the cities
in the 1880's and 1890 ’ s , but major success was elusive until
the founding of the Gran Federacion Obrera 、 de Chile (FOCR) in
1909. Very moderate at first. it advocated an 8-hour day ,

/

k‘
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Throughout the ParliamentaryPeriod the ruling
groups were unable or unwilling to recognize the inevitable
results of rising expectations among the lower classes tn
the face of economic distress.

Only a handful of sincere

reformers dotted the Chilean scene , and these few received
encouragement from the tremendous volume of literature
which decried the miserable living conditions endured by a
large segment of the population.

In fact , Chilean TTmuck-

rakers" produced a greater proportion of such books and
articles than did the famed Muckrakers in the United
States , but they failed to generate any concerted effort
to correct the existing inequities.

Most of the reformers

approached their goalfrom a basically conservative orientation.

They defended the concept of a stratified society

with a class of brute laborers at its base , and they clung
tothe belief that the lower classes were willing to be
ruled.

Since the masses did not aspire to a position of

greater influence , they reasoned , then unrest and agitation
hadto be the·;work of subversives.
also the

stan~e

Fundamentally , this was

ofthe defenders of the· status quo; the

difference lay in the

f~ct

that the reformers recognized an

urgent need to easethe plight of the masses if the political
sickness insurance , and arbitration of disputes; however , it
soon turned to the left and by 1917 was avowedly revolutionary. See Robert J. Alexander , Prophets 으효 쁘트 Revolution ,
p. 55; also , Pike , p. 110.

’.‘-’
t흙!톨톨

8

and social system was to remain intact.

Significant improve-

ment in living conditions was essential to keep the lower
classes relatively passive and inert in the hierarchical
structure.
Whether motivated by enlightened self-interest or
sincere concern for the suffering population , Chile ’ s small
group of forward-looking aristocrats undertook an enormous
task , and their failure was due more tothe circumstances
of the times than to their own lack of ability or dedication.

Chileans had experienced a

p~rceptible

in national morals and in the national morale.

decline both
They had

lost confidence in the leaders and pride in their institutioris.

The economy was unbalanced 'and unhealthy; and a

sizable portion of the nation ’ s citizens--ill , unfed ,
unclothed , and without shelter--appearedalmost ready to
rise up and overturn the old order. 6
Such was the state of the Republic when Arturo
Alessandri made his entrance ipto national politics.
*

6See Pike , Chapter μ ， particularly the section
entit l.ed "Self Criticism: The Favorite National Pastime";
see also'Edwards and Frei , pp. 17μ-6.
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The
。f

Pr
.

THE SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1915

w .,‘ n c e
of Tarapaca was created 1n

188니

out

territory acquired from Peru 1n the War of the Pacific.

By the second decade of the twentieth century this desert
area , rich with nitrate beds , had become the political
fief

。f

Senator Arturo del Rf。 who commanded the blind

obedience of the provincial administrative and judicial
authorities.
。f

Corruption flourished under the protection

the local government; and although a parliamentary com-

m1ss10n had previously investigated and reported the
deplorable state of the pUblic ser’v1ces 1n

Ta~apaca，

attempts

by the government 1n Santiago to rectify the situation were
futile. 7

As the end of the Barros Luco administration drew

near , general elections were scheduled for March 7 , 1915.
One of the twelv’e senate seats to be contested was that held
. by del R{o. 8
7Augusto Iglesias , Alessandri: Una etapa de la
democracia 닫낀 America , p. 332. See also-효Icardo Don 。표5 ，
Alessandri , -agitador y demoledor: Cincuent'a anos de his---- -- --뜨꽉효 politica 브트 Chi工e ， pp. 156-63-:
8Department of State Files (Records of the Department of State Relati끓 혼at단e Internal Affai끓 ;람Chile ,
T캉Tδ-T강 29 ~ational Archi융등 Microfilm Publicat! ons , Micro~
copy No. μ87) ， hereinafter cited as nSF’. 825.00/10μ， G.F.
Summerlin toRobert Lansing , March 3r;- 1915.
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Less than three months before the 1915 elections ,
A1essandri received a telegram from his personal friend

/ -

,..

Julio Guzman Garcla , the president of the Liberal Party in
.~

,..

•.•

_.

Iquique , pffering him the Liberal Alliance (Alianza) senatorial candidacy for Tarapac~.

Alessandri expressed.his

gratitude for the display of confidence but declined the
proffered candidacy , stating that he sincerely desired to
continue in the Chamber of Deputies.

He wanted to spare

himself the ordeal of campaigning in a province where the
difficulty of opposing the caudillaje of Arturo del R{I。
was well known.
。f

Furthermore , he took note of the presence

other prominent prospective candidates , among them:

Balmacedista Oscar Viel Cavero , President of the Radical
Party Juan Castellon , and Liberal deputy Maximiliano
/

Ibanez.
fought

The northern Liberal leaders anticipated a hardan~

violent campaign , and for this reason searched

for a candidate who notonly held the correct political
views , but who possessed the special attributes of courage
and of persuasion characteristic of the caudillo.

In the

view of the Tarapaquenos , Alessandri seemed to be the only
man capableof running with probable success.

Additional

-.

'"
_.
support came from the poet Victor
Domingo
Silva who , convinced of the necessity of nominating a candidate who-was
determined to put up a fight , contributed his enthusiasm
and skill as a writer and as an ardent patriot to launch

￥·

繼數뚫찮투과-짧톰
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11
A1essandri into the fray.9
One afternoon in late December

191μ

,

Alessandri

encountered del R{o in the gardens of the Chamber building.
At the mention of the coming elections , polite conversation
changed to heated discussion and the senator angrily shouted
a threat to Alessandri if he should be so foolish as to
accept.the opposition candidacy.

That provocation dispelled

any doubts Alessandri may have had about running; he sent a
t~legram to Tarapac~ accepting the senate candidacy.10

Meeting in Iquique on January 9 , 1915 , the Provincial Convention nominated Alessandri for the Senate and Rambn
Briones

L~co

as candidate for the Chamber of

De puties.

A

/

few 9ays later Victor Domingo Silva arrived in Iquique to
assumehis battle position as head of the Liberal paper La
Provincia.

He declared that the contest would be drawn

between a progr'am of reform and prosperity and one "of
fraud and of exploitation of the masses for the benefit of
a few."

The paper became the prime mover of the Alessandri

campaign..

Th~

vibrant pen of the poet sparked the enthusi-

asm of partisans of the Liberal candidate , extolled his
attributes , and emphasized the opportunity at hand:

the

/

liberation of Tarapaci from the spoliation to which ithad
9Iglesias , pp. 332-3;Donoso , p. 16μ .
10 Iglesias , p. 333.

J,..
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12
beensubjected by political caciquismo . 11
In lateJanuary , Alessandri departed for Iquique
to organize his campaign workers.

His adversaries , rely-

ing on the aid and protection of the Montenegro Ministry ,
quickly effectedmeasures to hamper the Alianza cause;
and one appointment in particular merits notice.

The del

R{o regime secured the transfer of prefectof police L파 S
Vargas to the South , and in his place the Santiago government appointed Rogelio

De lgado

,

a daring and unscrupulous--

but "reliable"--man who formerly had been sub-prefect of
the police force of Antofagasta.

Delgado was destined to

playa critical role in the events ofthe next few weeks. 12
Alessandri arrived in Iquique Sunday , January

2μ ，

1915 , on the Peruvian steamship Huallaga accompanied by don
Luis Malaquias Concha , Democrat candidate for deputy.

The

ship was met by groups of people on the dock (some were del
Rfo ’ s ruffians} and small boats filled with cheering , flagwaving admirers whoswarmed on board the vessel to greet
the ir

'1

redeemer."

Alessandri had to wait several minutes

before disembarking while his supporters cleared the dock

11 Donoso , p. 165.
12 Due to the activities of this official , plus an
assault on a Radical Party demonstration in Iquiquein which
mounted police charged the public with drawn sabers ,
A1essandri earlier had summoned Minister of Interior Pedr 。
Nolasco Montenegro into the Chamber of Deputies. He demanded
that the Minister appoint a new police chief who could guarantee order andrespect for the law in Iquique. Iglesias , pp.
333-μ.

f
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13
。f Rifstas stationed there to impede the arrival of the

deputy from Curic6.

The party then made its way to the

Chalet Suisse (a hotel at the edge of the dock district)
surrounded by enthusiastic adherents.
F

The only unpleasant

‘

‘

element of the entire day was the mud which spattered the
shoes and trousers of the travelers and townspeople; the
night before , del Rio had ordered a watering of the dusty
/

unpaved streets and the result was a large mudwallow.

From

his window atthe Chalet Suisse , Alessandri addressed the
throng gathered in the mud below , describing his campaign
as one of liberation.

He assured them thatthe cause of

freedom would prevail , climaxing his words with the pledge:
ttl have not come to fight , but to triumph. ,, 13
Almost from the moment of Alessandri ’ s arrival in
Iquique , the campaign was characterized by unusual violence
that ranged fromattacks on the houses of political adversaries to assassinations.

Gangs of del R{o's ruffians ,

paid with local funds andprotected by the police ,

perpe~

trated offenses day after day that contributed to keeping
the region under a reign of terror.
On hisreturn to Santiago , Alessandri denounced the
/

situation in'Tarapaca before the February 12 session of the
Chamber. of. Deputies ,

.acc~sing.the.+nterior

Ministry .of open

13
Iglesias , pp 33μ-5. Unless otherwise noted , all
translations are the responsibility of the writer.

‘

，，~’

f ‘

，~힐~.:.-←

‘

lt

electoral intervention.

He referred to the appointment of

Delgado as prefect of police , and to the maintenance of
armed gangs subsidized by the municipality.

He

als 。

expressed the opinion that the Government was incapable
of maintainingpublic order , and he suggested the humiliating possibility that foreign consular agents would
demand guarantees of safety for the interests of their
nationals.

Further , Alessandri maintained that the Minis-

ter of Interior , who had final responsibility under the
Constitution for the conduct of elections , had refused to
s~nd

a high-ranking army officer to preside over the bal-

loting and insure an honest·vote.lμ

He contended that the

shameful episodes which had occurred in Iquique and in the
entire province of Tarapac~ could not be swept under the
rug by the government.

(In the -opinion of one Alessan-

drista , more than just another legislative election , the
1915 contest in the Chilean Northcould be looked at as
‘

the confrontation of two regimes:

that of liberty of

suffrage onthe one hand and that of systematic and
official intervention on the other.)15

Before the

assembled deputies the candidate thundered ,
lμ

Donoso , p. 166.

...

15 Iglesias , pp. 335-6. And yet , once in La Moneda ,
Alessandri did not hesitate to exert official influence in
parliamentary elections.

~，

.

!

'
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15

I do not demand the votes of public
functionaries , policemen , and municipal ~fficials who maywant to support
de Rio; I only demand that 'order be
respected and that the lives of the
citizens be defended , for if things
continue the way they are going now
the life of the august Interior
Minist_er will not be sufficiently
long ιfor hi~/ to repent the horrenqous
thing들 which-might occur in Tarapaca.
The Minister , Pedro Montenegro , who was in attendance , answered vehemently and started a violent incident
during which highly insulting expressions were

exchangεd

(a notuncommon thing , Chilean parliamentary politics being what they were).

In

Montenegr。’ s

opinion , electoral

liberty was not menaced , and he stated that he was not
dis·posed to remove any provincial official without due
16
cause.~U The remaining cabinet members supported the
position of theInterior Minister.

After the brief dia-

logue there remained no other place to continue the dispute but the field of honor , another recurrent feature
ofChilean politics.
was carried

ηout

According to

프보

Mercurio , the duel'

February 13 on the estate owned by Luis

Barce16 Lira which he called , ironically , Villa Tranquila •
Onlookers included the four seconds and a 'doctor; however ,

16Iglesias , p. 336.
17Don080 , p. 166.

16
Although neither man attempted a reconciliation ,
negotiations between the Government and the Alianza were
initiated shortly thereafter , and among the several points
considered was the matter of the change of authorities in
Tarapaca.

Undoubtedly influenced by the violent campaign

against interventionism conducted by opposition newspapers
following the Alessandri-Montenegro debate , President Juan
Luis Sanfuentes agreed to send to Iquique General Sofanor
Parra , whowould assume command of the military forces of
Further , the intendant was replaced tempo-

the province.

rarily by an official of the Finance Ministry.
Up in Iquique new outbreaks of violence took place
prior to the arrival of General Parra and the return of
Alessandri to the North.

On the night of February 26 a
/

police official , Manuel Jes6s Maira , was assassinated by
/

a party of brigands as he left the Hotel Genova.

Maira

was suspected of having refused to do the bidding of
That same night , moreover , thieves

Prefect Delgado.
theιdead

entered

official ’ s home and took possession of

some papers.that would have been damaging to his superior
officer. l8

Two days later the Huasco steamed into port;

on board were General Parra , his aide Major Bernardo Gbmez
Solar , substitute Intendant.Ricardo
Dm

s .
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Alessandri party.19

Among those traveling with the senate

candidate were V{ctor Domingo Silva and ex-army officer
Manuel Lemus , the Democrat candidate for deputy from
Arauco who was also acting as Alessandri ’ s bodyguard. 20
Theopposition had been busy assembling a sizable
gang of toughs , paid by the municipality , to supplement
del Rfo ’ s police force; but the Alianza was not without
recourse.

It too mobilized a well-remunerated and color-

fully named force of highwaymen:

a certain Chacbn , alias

"El quince cobres" (Fifteen Coppers); "El repollo chico fT
(Little Cabbage);

1

’El rubio cordero" (Blonde Lamb); "El

helado en paquete" (Ice cream bar); "El busca la vida"
(Scavenger); "El repollo grande" (Big Cabbage).

These

men were recruited especially among the ruffians who
congregated near the waterfront.

Thepreparations that

were made on both sidesseemed to be more appropriate for
a gang warthan for a contest of political opinion. 2l
During his brief tenure in Iquique , Intendant
V~le←z resisted Alessandri's d~mands to put the police

force under military authority , consequently he gave up
the maintenance of order in the streets , a determining
19 Iglesias , p. 336.
20

..

noso , p. 173 (Note).

21Donoso , p. 167.
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18
factor in the violence that was to follow.
Also in the week prior to the election , the minister- 。f the Appellate Court of Tacna , Gustav 。 sepGlVeda ,
had arrived in Iquique on an extraordinary visit to draw
up the indictment for the death of Officer Maira , and
another against Prefect Delgado for arbitrary imprisonment
。f

Aliancistas.

On March 5 , after investigation , Judge

SepGlVeda 。rdered that Delgado be suspended from the exercise of his duties , but the intendant refused to execute
the judicial decree. 22

That act of defiance was but one

further demonstration of the breakdown of Constitutional
authority; however it had no practical effect , for the
prefect met his death later that same night.
The elections were to take place on Sunday ,
March 7; on the preceding Friday , Alessandri was warned
on three separate occasions of threats against his life.
The first warnirtg came

fro~

a policeman who years before

had been an employee in thehome of Alessandri ’ smother ,
and the other pieces of intelligence were delivered to
the candidate as he was addressing a gathering at the
Radical Youth Center·. 23

Apparently. not sharing. the

22 Donoso , pp. 167-8.
23The warnings noted the suspicious movements of
Prefect Delgado and the armed mounted police force which
constantly accompanied him , giving every indication that
some type of plot was being hatched. Alessandri ’ s friends

~.
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19
anxiety expressed by his friends , Alessandri continued his
:t .

speech , concluding withthe admonition that the audience
should exercise great moderation and dissolve

immediat~ly.

However , the rousing orations had so inflamed the ebullient
crowd that such a request was patently ridiculous.

The

Alessandristas left in search of the police , striding

t。

the strains of the Marseillaise played by an improvised
brass band , cheering the Radical Party and the Liberal
Alliance , and shouting down with the police and the prefeet.

"iAbajo la policia!

del pueblo!

iMuera el prefecto asesino
,

l. Ret{rense los pacos! ，， 2μ

Alessandri , one" of the last to leave , headed in
the opposite direction from that taken by the throng.
Noting with increased concern the unusual darkness through。 ut

the neighborhood and the groups of mounted police lurk-

ing in sidestreets , the candidate changed his mind and
decided togo to the Telegraph Office to notify Manuel
Rivas Vicuna of the ominous turn which events were taking.
Alessandri pushed his way past the

comisari。 。f

Iquique

and entered the office , accompaniedby Manuel Lemus , severalassoeiates and his secretary.

Scarcely had he

counseled himto avoid certain streets , and they indicated
that Lemus couldtake measures if he thought it opportune.
Iglesias , p. 337; Donoso , p. 168.
2μ

Donoso , pp. 168-9.

*훌
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written the destination of the message when carbine shots
sounded in the street , followed by scattered rifle and
revolver fire.

Lemusran to close the doorto the street

and in doing so was wounded in the leg.

Alessandri and

his compatiions sought safety in the small room that served
as the office of the chief telegrapher; as they burst
through the doorway they came face to face with Delgado
whowas half-crouched behind the desk with a revolver in
his hand.

F’ rom this point the accounts of the melee dif-

fer , but whenthe altercation was over Delgado lay dead
on the floor of the Telegraph Office.

Outside , where the

police had continued to fire into the crowd and to charge
with swords raised , the toll was three men dead and numerous wounded. 25
The employees who were caught in the interior of
the building retreated upstairs , followed by Alessandri
and his·companions and scores of demonstrators who had
broken into the office.

Lemus , bleeding profusely , was

assisted to a smallattic room and given first-aid.

Down

in the street the noise indicated that the police had
received reinforcements , and with little hesitat.ion most
。f

the occupants of the building prudently fled via the

rooftops of neighboring houses.

Alessandri recognized

that.i.t.. woul c;1. not. be.. considered. very. dignified [O r
25 Donoso , p. 169; Iglesias , pp. 337-9.
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courageou 설

for a senate candidate to be forced to escape

by the roof , and he feared the resulting reactionof the
electorate would be catastrophic.

Therefore , he slowly

descendedthe main stairway peering into the gun barrels
。f the ~aiting guards. 26

Requesting that the

accompany him ,

sub-comisari。

g

Alessandri went directly to the Hotel F~nix to seek aid
from General Parra.

However , the general already had been

alertedand in a matter 6f minutes an army troop was dispatched to restore order at the scene of the tragedy.

The

soldiers took charge of the telegraph building , driving out
the police , and they then

B;ssisted

Poblete in setting up an inquest.

criminal Judge Ismael
The army also began

patrol of the streets and public places.
Shortly after 11:00 A.M. in the telegraph office
Judge Pob1ete convened the inquest; however , the following
day the hearing of depositions was continued by Gustavo
Sep61veda , minister of the Appellate Co~rt of Tacna.
-

Donos 。’ s

In

estimation , the inquiry seemed prepared with the

deliberate purpose of muddling the whole matter and hiding
the truth.

Only seven witnesses had been held; many were

allowed to leave with Alessandri without giving their
26The Iglesias version (see p. 3μ0) is based on
Alessandri ’ s recollection of the event. The statement of
witness Arturo Prat Carvajalas quoted in Donoso (p. 170)
differs somewhat.
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names or making statements.

The author concluded that one

does not need much perspicacity to determine who finished
off Prefect Delgado:

from the

stateπlents

filed by

Alessandri and by other witnesses , the responsibility of
41
Lemus was crystal clear. 27

The autopsy showed that in addi-

tion to a cranial fracture , the victim ’ s aorta was perforated
by a bullet from a Browning pistol.

Thus the precise cause

of death was a massive hemorrhage from the bullet wound;
however , the inquest did not establish who shot Delgado. 28
The voting took place as scheduled on March 7 , and
the Liberal Alliance won an overwhelming victory in the
pr 。vince of Tarapaca.

Alessandri was elected senator and
/

Ram6n Briones Luco (Radical) and Luis Malaqu{as Concha (Demoerat) were voted seats in the Chamber of Deputies , while the
government coalition succeeded in electing only two deputies.
Nationally , the Coalieionistas retained their majority in
the lower body while the Aliancistas gained control of the
Senate. 29
27 Donoso , pp.169-70; p. 17μ ， Note μ.
28 Donoso , p. 170; pp. 173-μ ， Notes 3 and μ.
Alessandri carried a Smith and Wesson. When Parra ’ s
aide examined the gun it was fully loaded and there was no
smell of powder. Iglesias , p. 3μo.
29 .DS말
. . . ,... ..... 825.00/107
,,"",.. ,.. "'" J
, Summerlin to Lansing , March 31 , 1915.
Throughout the country , 12 senators and the entire
Chamber of Deputies were to be chosen. The Coalition lost 2
seats in the Senate while the Alliance gained 3 togive it a
19-16 majority. The Coalition controlled the Chamber of
Deputies 66-50.
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In April , municipal elections were held , and
Tarapaquenos once again endorsed the Liberal Alliance
sLate of candidates .. With thatsecond' triumph , the
Alianza broke the hold of the corrupt local machine ,
~

..

and the once-powerful caudillo del Rio disappeared from
the political scene.

He returned to his provincial resi-

dence where he spent the last fifteen years of his life.
The poet Silva , whose mettle and passionate devotion

t。

the cause had a decisive influence on the electoral contest , returned to playing his lyre and ·composing sonnets
to the victor.
of

De lgado

knowledge.

All those who were involved in the death

evidently took an oath to keep secret their
On his return to Santiago , Alessandri received

a warm and enthusiastic welcome from his supporters , unaware
that the shadow of the prefect would pursue him tenaciously
throughout his political career. 30

*

...
30Donoso , p. 171.
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II I.

THE EMERGENCE OF ALESSANDRI AS
LIBERAL ALLIANCE LEADER

The year 1915 also witnessed a presidential election
in Chile" one in which real issues were introduced.

Emerging

as leading contenders for the nomination of the Liberal
Alliance- were Eliodoro Yanez , a sincere reform-advocate;
Guillermo Barros Jara; Ismael Tocornal; Ismael Vald~s Valdes;
and Vicente Reyes , incorruptible but past his prime.

The

Liberalfriends of Agust!n Edwards , 'conservative statesman ,
tried to persuade him to bethe nominee of the Alianza , but
he was unwilling to desert the Coalition.

Alessandri , by
r~cent

virtue of his impressive performance in the

senatorial

campaign , received anumber of votes in the nominating convention.
。f

However , in a compromise to avert the disintegration

the Liberal Alliance , the candidacy was bestowed upon the

comparatively colorless Liberal Party leader , Javier Angel
’

F’ igueroa. 3l

The convention of-' the Coalition parties was held

the following week , and on the third ballot Juan Luis
Sanfuentes received the nomination over candidates Abdon
Cifuentes and Agust{n Edwards.

A senator from Concepcion

since 1906 , Sanfuentes was the leading member ofthe Demo용

cratic Liberal Party.32
31팍프.
n
T"
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825.00/10 니，
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32nsF . 825.00/107 ,

Summerlin to Lansing , March 31 , 1915.
Summerlin to Lansing , March 16 , 1915.
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Alessandri insisted that prior to the provincial
elections of 1915 he never considered the possibility of
33 that senatorial
his becoming President of the Republic;~~
campaign , nevertheless , served to crystallize in the minds
。f

the public the image of the vigorous parliament member.

It also recalled the memory of other Alessandri campaigns:
hisvi tuperation toward the admin istrationof Pedro Montt ,
particularly in regard to the 500 , 000 pound government loan
to the Casa de Granja y C{a.;3μ his arrests as the romantic
pamphleteer during the Revolution

o~

1891; and his note-

worthy tenure as Minister of Public Works in 1899 during
the regime of F’ ederico ErrazurizEchaurren.

A group of

enthusiastic followers in Iquique expressed those sentiments
in a pamphlet directed to the Radical Party assemblies of
the country , soliciting support for their endeavor to convert the new Senator of the Desert into the future presidential candidate. 35

A cUl~inating factor was the tour

around the country with Figueroa ’ s campaign party , during
33Alessandri , p.27.
3μThe Casa Granja operated eight nitrate offices ,
and owned the port of Coloso and the railroad of Aguas
Blancas that served fourteen nitrate offices in the northern Chilean pampa. After the agitation that had shaken the
province of Tarapaca during 1907 , the firm announced that it
was threatened with violent stoppages in its districts and
demanded government help. Donoso , p. 103.
35
Iglesias , p. 3μ1.
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which Alessandri received spontaneous demonstrations of
popular sympathy and affection which overshadowed those
for the candidate , and further seemed to affirm his political potential for the future. 36
The presidential elections were held on June 25 ,
and the Coalition candidate Sanfuentes won by a small
majority of six or sevenelectors.

There were minor dis-

turbances in all parts of the country , and several persons
were killed in Santiago.

But the police and the army kept

the situation well in hand.
cl~imed

Some Liberal Alliance leaders

victory for their candidate by a margin of eight

electors , but higher officials of the Alianza conceded
defeat.

Considerablebitterness was expressed by younger

members of the Liberal Party , many of whom stated openly
that Sanfuenteswould never be permitted to occupy the
presidential chair.

De monstrations

by the Aliancistas

continued to occur nightly , always accompanied by minor
‘

incidents.

The Liberal Alliance leadership accused the

Coalition of having committed numerous frauds and falsi,

fications , and appointed a committee of party members to
investigate.

In his confidential report the

Ame~ican

Charg~ concluded , "It is well known that the country is

Liberal ~.e. ， favorable to the Alianz링; that frauds were
c;:.q~m i.t:ted9n.bot:hsides;

and.that the Canoidatewho had.the

36Alessandri , p. 28.

’-

q짧顆했鷹빼續廳轉뺑關轉鎭 f爾擺‘뺏~헛랩鄭聊廳爾輔聽購體羅훌屬爾轉짧觸鷹廳廳騙廳蕭톨톨轉爾뺑廳轉輔轉靈폈훨

27
strongest financial support and the longest purse obtained
a majority of the electors; and there was no concealment of
the fact that votes were purchased right and left. ’ r37
The Provincial electors cast their ballots on Sunday ,
July 25" and the resul ts gave 179 votes to Sanfuen tes and
17μ

to F’ igueroa (one electoral ballot from Iquique was not

counted).

The Alianza leaders persisted in their claims of

fraud involvingsome twenty Coalition electors , and attempted
to have the whole election referred to a Tribunal of Honor
for review. 38

Following the provisions of the Constitution ,

the Congress met in joint session on Friday , September 17 ,
to scrutinize the

election~·

Irregularities were found in

several departments , notably Constituci6n and Castro; and
。ne

ofSanfuentes electors for Valdivia was disqualified;

Sanfuentes remained the victor with
Figueroa.

17μ

electors to 173 for

Thus neither candidate received an absolute major-

ity of the whole number of presidential electors , and the
election was thrown into Congress where victory for
Sanfuentes

w~s

aforegone conclusion.

According to the U.S.

Ambassador , Liberal leaders had no hope of winning; the
Coalition accepted the disqualification of its electors only
because it.commanded.a.safe.tnajority.in the.Congress.39
37nsF . 825.00/108 , Summerlin to Lansing , June '29 , 1915.
혐딛. 825.00/109 , Summerlin to Lansin~， July 13 , 1915.

38현 F. 825.00/110 , Summerlin to Lansing , July 27 , 1915.
39 0SF . 825.00/113 , Henry P. Fletcher to Lansing ,
September 20 , 1915.
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The first part of the Sanfuentes administration saw
the customary parade of cabinets , as the Liberals pursued
their obstructionist tactics.

Alessandri repeatedly raised

the issue of the corrupt police force of Iquique , and the
dispute degenerated into a personal battle between the
senator and the new Minister of Interior Luis Izquierdo
E’redes.μo The fundamental criticism made by those attacking

the ministry wasthat thegovernment was preparing to intervene in the coming elections (1918).

However , Conservatives

and Nationals viewed the controversy as an attempt to overthrow not only the Ministry , but to undermine the parliamentary regime. μl
The entrance of the middle class into the political
arena was accentuated in the elections of 1915 with the
Alianza victories in Congress , but it was not until 1918
that positive signs of a desire .for reform in the social
and economic spheres appeared.

The rebellion of the elec-

torate to 'which Alberto Edwards refers could be more precisely

defin~d

as "the rebellion of the provinces against

the hegemony of Santiago."μ2 The provincial elections of
March 1918 were hard fought , and money was used freely.
An article

i~

a provincial journal noted that the Coalicio-

nistas Qpened.thebiddingat300.pesos.and were.paying
μo

μ80

so , p. 196.

μlD。n 。so ， p. l97.
μ2

Donoso , p. 208.
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pesos per vote when their funds ran out.

The Aliancistas ,

with only moderate financial support , quickly used up what
money they had.μ3

For strength to compete successfully

with the candidates of the Coalition , the Liberal Alliance
had tolook for adherents in the camp of the agricultural
or industrial plutocracy , in spite of the coolness which
members of these groups displayed toward Liberal doctrines.
For this reason the campaign did not have an ideological
basis.

It did not propose a program to ameliorate social

ills or to correct abuses in the political sphere , although
the platformdid take notice of the country ’ s strong Liberal
sentiment and the determination oriented toward crushing the
influence of the Conservative Party.μμ The Liberal Alliance
gained a large majority in both houses , and the Coalition
was plunged into despair; President Sanfuentes even considered tendering his resignation.
The Coalition

expr~ssed

its willingness to turnover

immediately the job of running the government but Alianza
leaders wer& reluctant to assume the responsibility of leadership until the new Congress began its deliberations.

A dis-

agreement between theMinister.of.War.and.the.rest of the

μ 3 DSf • 825.00/116 , F’rederic de Billier to Lansing ,
March 9 , τ캉τ8. In the Senate the Aliancistas won 24 seats to
13 for theCoalicionistas; in the Chamber of Deputies the
result was 68 to 46 , with μ Independents.
μμ
~Donoso , p. 209.

i

·• ‘
•

‘~~i~Y~1!

μ:

ε ‘:‘ E

30

Cabinet (with presidential support) concerning punitive
measures to be taken against some naval officers brought
on a ministerial cr1s1s , and the entir"e cabinet resigned
April 15 , 1918.μ5
,The President then saw the opportunity

creating

。f

a division 1n the ranks of the victorious Liberal Alliance ,
and he leaked

t。

the Radical Party leaders the proposal

that Alessandri was to be entrusted with the responsibility
。rganizing
。f

a

σ。

appeared

the new ministry. 니 6
ro

뺑

。f

Already , indications had

rift between Alessandri and Yanez ..

The latter claimed that the success of the Alianza was due
σ。

야

-largely to the v

o u g propaganda of his daily newspaper

La r;l aci6n; therefore , he was entitled to the fruits of
victory--namely , leadership
nation of the

!’

the movement .

μ7

The desig-

Lion" was opposed strenuously by some of the

President ’ S closest advisers

十」

a presidential candidate.

Edwards referred to Alessandri ’ s appointment by

十』

。f

Alberto
§
>

빽

the consecration

•
1

없

。f

were convinced that being
1
L
‘ mp or
Minister’ of Interior was
wh 。

라

named to the post
t。

。f

W .
‘

"It was believed that this designation would incite the
μ5

Donoso , p .. 209 ..

μ6

In Frei ’ s opinion , Sanfuentes gave an example of
his gr~~t p~~rioti~~ by ~ubmi~ti~~. ~o the_~opu~ar w~l~ a~d
respecting theparliamentary tradition . Edwards and" Frei ,
p .. 183 ..
μ7

Donoso , p. 210 ..
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other Aliancista magnates (who still claimed an important
following in Congress) to rebellion against the new chief ,
thus producing the dislocation of the victorious parties."μ8
Tocornal , offended because the President had not summoned him
to La Moneda , temporarily relinquished the direction of the
Liberal Party to ManuelRivas andY'fiez.

Rivas related in

his memoirs that Sanfuenteshad offered to him also the
leadership of the Cabinet , but he declined and suggested
the names oftwo other likely candidates.

He counseled

the President that the-appointment of Alessandri would be
a grave

error.μ9

Finally , after three days of laborious negotiations
during which Y'fiez and Alessandri heatedly disputed the honor
of organizing the first cabinet of the Liberal Alliance ,
Alessandri was successful in forming aministry made up of
three Radicals and three Liberals.
remained excluded.

The Democrat party

The Ministry was integrated as follows:

InteriorForeign RelationsTreasuryPublic InstructionWar and Marine . .
Public 'Works-

Alessandri , Liberal
'-Daniel Feliu , Radical
Luis Claro Solar , Liberal
Pedro Aguirre Cerda , Radical
Jorge Valdivieso Blanco , Liberal
Ram6n Briones Luco , Radical

Sanfuentes may have hoped to neutralize Alessandri ’ s politicalin~~uence.~yputting.~im.~t.the.hea~.pf.the.CabiQet
， .but
μ8

202-3.

Alberto Edwards Vives ,

핀르

frondaaristocratica , p.

μ9Donoso， p. 10. The twq leaders suggested were Luis
Barros Borgono and Antonio Valdes Cuevas.
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the wily politician made the most of his opportunity by
outlining a vast program of administrative action.

il

Among

i ’i i l l - - I ; I g ! t
’
igtsir--f**1ii
’ ’ ’f i F g I I 낄 ! t x

rev1S1on of the laws of

the proposals he presented were:

civil marr1age and registry , improvement

。f

education ,

social legislation for the welfare of-the working classes ,
fair employment practices 1n the nitrate industry , immediate consideration of bills relating

t。

modification of the

Constitution , and rev1s10n of the tax system.

The new

Interior Minister further requested that the var10us
parties represented 1n Congress consider it their patriotic duty to reach an agreement on the pending appropr1aFar broader than a ministerial program , the

tions measure.

reforms Alessandri set forth constituted a presidential program designed for implementation during the length

。f

an

entire administration. 50
The legislators

。f

both political coalitions

received the new Cabinet be,nev olen t1y , and then proceeded
t。

however; and from the beginning
fighting spirit

。f

clearly evident.
。f

new unlon
.of the

。ld

。f

the regular sess10ns the

the new parliamentary membership was
Alessandri enthusiastically supported a

Liberals and Radicals--the partial resurrection

Liberal Alliance of 1875--in order to
。

Dm

며

%

‘-

The truce was short-lived ,

pass the appropriations bill.

-- p l'. 210-11.
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his projected reforms.

He utilized the interpellation of

Conservative officials over a local problem in the town
Sl
。f Castroto eulogize the old Alliance ..J"" and to promote
the new one.
his

clev~r

He flattered the Radicals and Liberals with

oratory:
The country has wanted to overthrow
this anarchic regime and return to
homogeneous and truly parliamentary
government. The high~st honor that a
man can attain in political life .
is to come tothis bench and be able t 。
say with pride: I am representing the
aspirations , the orientations and the
program of national ambitions that are
contained~tn the program of the Liberal
Alliance. 52

Alessandri ’ s performance was crudely condemned by
the Conservative deputyRafael Luis Gumucio , who accused
him of running for the presidency.

The deputy ’ s attack

concluded:
Public opinion , after appraising whether
or not the Minister of the Interior
aspires to the presidential candidacy ,
will appraise also if his attitude in
the Castro affair , if his flattery of the
Radical Party , if his attacks on the Conservative Party and , above all , if his
51 The dominant Liberal-Conservative coalition broke
up in 1873 and a new combination composed of Liberals , Radicals. and Nationals became known as the Liberal Alliance.
In the 1920 Alliance the Democratic Liberals (Balmacedistas)
~nd the Democrats joined with theLiberals and Radicals.
Federico G. Gil , The Political System οf↑ Chile , pp. 셔 3-μ.
b
In CastroL도 he judge surrogate굽as forced to resign
ecause of unwarranted pressure by the townspeople.
52 Cited iu Donoso , p. 212.

‘,
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magnificent doctrinair’ e boasting and
his program of agitation , are to serve
the country or simply are to serve his
presidential ambitions. 53
Alessandri continued to hoist the standard of reform , and
he maintained that the electoral triumph of March 3 was
his popularmandate.
The other issue debated at length in the Congress
during Alessandri ’ s Ministry was the matter of reforming
the by-laws to permit cloture of debate.
~mployed

After having

the same tactics with devastating results , the

Alianza now wanted to end obstruction by the Coalicionistas; and when the Conservative legislators made concilistory gestures the Minister of Interior took the opportunity
of effecting a compromise.

At that point the Liberals came

to believe that Alessandri was sacrificing their interests
to those of the Radicals and Democrats , while at the same
time looking for support among the Nationals and De mocratic
Liberals (Balmacedistas).

Dissention grew more pronounced

in the ranks of the majority combination.

Alessandri pre-

.;.

ferred a total cabinet crisis to a partial shake-up , and
his Ministri fell by vote of censure the first week of
September.5μ

In.retrospect.the.breakup
53
5μ

of.th~.Liberal.Alliance

Cited in Donoso , p. 213.
Donoso , p. 215.
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was inevitable.
。 ligarchical

A hybrid alliance of basically conservative

elements with the newly emancipated political

forces of the provinces had to dissolve by virtue of its
own dynamics.

But in the days following the brilliant

Alianza triumph at the polls , it was difficult for the
victors--in the face of widespread popular enthusiasm-to turn their back on recently proclaimed principles and
join a new coalition.

The conservative faction of the

Liberal Alliance resigned itself to lending apparent
assistance to a caudillo whom they basically feared above
all else.

As.this conservative element waivered , the left

wing took advantage of their indecision and grabbed most
of the highgovernment positions and the administrative
posts in the provinces.

(The responsibility for primary

instruction went to the anti-clerical Radicals.) 'However ,
behind the scenes and with the utmost secrecy , the resistance against Alessandri and his clique took shape.

Heading

the covertmovement in the Chamber of Deputies was Manuel
Rivas.Vicu5~，

whodid not advocate open opposition but pre-

ferred to assume an ambiguous position in the hope of dominating the Alliance without destroyingit. 55

Such tactics

‘

might have met with moderate success in an earlier period ,
but.th~y.weredestined.to

"'55

fail.in.the

turbu~ent

times ahead .
....

Edwards , p. 203.
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Mere political maneuvers , no matter how skillful , could
not prevent a direct clash between the old social forces-near"collapse , and the as yet amorphous but impassioned
movement that stirred a large portion of the country.
Slightly more than two months after the resignation of the Alessandri ministry the World War ended , and
immediate repercussions were felt in the Chilean economy.
Nitrate exports fell to almost nothing and the cost of
living rose sharply.

Hardest hit were the workers

wh 。

violently expressed their discontent in the nitrate
fields and in the large cities.
marked the emergence of

th~

These circumstances

·proletariat in the political

life of Chile , and one of the few who saw clearly the
significance of the profound transformation was the Radical deputy Antonio Pinto Duran.
of

De cember

In the Chamber session

26 , 1918 , he asserted:

We are spectators at the transformation of all our values. Our old social
organization , formed by an omnipotent
。 ligarchy above and an uneducated and
m~serable people below , has been supplanted by the formation of a sizable
middle class--well-informed and intelligent--that is able to analyze situations
and make decisions for itself. that acts
with confidence and certainty ’ • • • .56
Thus , the conflict had first emerged in the social sphere ,
but

the.~epercussionswereimmediatein.the.p<;>l :j. t

56

:j. cal arena.

Cited in Donoso , p. 217.
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The Radicals , particularly the youth movement of the
party , became dissatisfied with their Ministers whomthey
characterized as representatives of tne oligarchy.

Yanez

and Alessandri fomented this discontent and fostered the
ambitions of other deputies who wanted to become Ministers.
The latter part of April the three Radical members resigned
and a new Cabinet was organized.
。f

During the regular session

Congress in the summer of 1919 , discussions i ‘ n the Senate

were devotedlargely to the bill for compulsory primary
education.

All recognized party leaders spoke extensively ,

thus encouraging much vitriolic oratory , especially among
members of the Radical Party who. adamantly opposed any
extension of Church influence in the school system.

The

venerable Radical patriarch Mac-Iver referred contemptuously to the new class-oriented creed , and he in turn was
bitterly attacked by younger senators.

Alessandri spoke

at length during the debates , refuted intelligently the
arguments advanced by Mac-Iver , and extolled the reform
sentiment which seemed to pervade the atmosphere.

In

Alessandri ’ swords:
The problems and reforms are not a
siren song , a sweet word that cajoles
and caresses the ear , as the senator
from Atacama has said; they are based
on fundamental principles of right and
justice , and they obey an imperious
present-day need. They strike forcibly
the duty and the conscience of the men
of state who owe them effective ·and

1

1
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preferential attention. It is not
acceptable that while some swim in
opulence , others are lacking absolutely in food , clothing , h~using ，
inspiration for the spirit , and convenient andadequate rest for the
body. Th~ principles of solidarity ,
。 f justice , and of social ~onserva
tion demand the existence of a prudent balance between the most
diverse social strata. 57
The debates continued to provoke recriminations pertaining
to the influence of the Church , the dirth of positive parliamentary action , and the ills of Chilean society generally.58
On the popular front , another large demonstration
took place in Santiago on August 29.

The hunger ralLy , as

it came to be called , vigorously depicted the desperate
situation of the workers and produced alarm in government
circles. 59 · While discontent daily grew more intense among
the bourgeoisie and the masses , thepoliticians feverishly
gathered their forces in preparation for the coming
elections.
The i ,pcreasing agitation and unrest among the
Chilean people also provoked deep concern in military circles , and thepoliticiansintendedtouse the situation for57 Cited in Donoso , p. 221.
58The primary education bill finally was passed on
theeve of adjournment.
59 Oonoso , p. 222.
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their ownadvantage.

The dissident faction in the army ,

led by Generals Guillermo Armstrong , Vi talicio Luis Lopez ,
and Manuel Moore , worked secretlyto strengthen the ties
between the chiefs of the various arms in order to bolster
the posi ’tion of the President of the Republic and to offer
him an effective force in case of major civil disorders.
The.officers also hoped to obtain legislation improving
the position of the military and permitting its members
to hold government posts , both diplomatic and provincial ,
and to run for Congress.

The tutelage over the government

which these men sought to exercise would have amounted

t。

rule by military junta. 60 .~he possibility of Alessandri's
involvement in the conspiracy was widely rumored; the
government moved quickly in , preferring charges against the
。fficers.6l

Those implicated were courtmartialed and the

affair was hushed up.62
charge d'affaires:

In the opinion of the American

"The only significance which remains

is the fact that there is throughout the ’ Clase Media ’
6ODorIiso , p . 227 ; DSF . 825 . oo/l20 , Warren Robbins t 。
Lansing , May 9 , 1919.
61Frederick M. Nunn , "Emil K1')rner and thePrussianization of the Chilean Army: Origins , Process and Consequences , 1885-1920 ," (unpublished article·in possession of
theauthor , Portland State College , 1968) , pp. 26-7.
62
The trial dragged on through the spring of 1920.
The prosecution had asked for the death sentenc~ ， but that
was "pr.o forma"; a nominal sentence could be expected. nSF.
825.00/131 , Joseph Shea to Bainbridge Colby , May μ , 1920τ←→
•
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and indeed throughout the country at large the conviction
that the Executive and Congress do not consider seriously
enough the labor conditions and economical problems which
now confront the government. tt63

Donoso concludes: "This

was not the first time that the politicians had intruded
in the barracks , but the conspiracy of 1919 exposed how
far even A1essandri had gone in his taskof corrupting
the armed forces.'

， 6μ

*

4

..............._ I
DSF. 825.00/123 , Robbins to Lansing , May 22 , 1919.

63..;...:.~
6μ

Donoso , p. 238.
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IV.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1920

At the end of the year 1919 the Liberal Party held
a convention in Santiago , and the provincial delegates to
that meeting clearly expressed their approval of Alessandri ’ s
likely candidacy for the office of President.

That fact

caused considerable uneasiness among the ruling clique of
the party , who questioned the background and qualifications
of thenew caudillo.

His forebearers had held no important

political positions , and Alessandri himself did not belong
to the select circle from which presidents ordinarily were
chosen.

He did not have a

recogni~ed

party

organizati~n

behind him; in fact , during more·than eighteen years in
Congress healmost always had worked independently , never
subjecting himself to the discipline of any party.

And

only occasionally had he joined the ranks of the Liberals. 65
These reasons were cited by the traditional elements of the
Liberal Party to justify their opposition to the candidacy
。f

the "Lion .11

The important business before theconvention

was the formation of a new general board of directors for

‘

the party , and Alessandri fought to obtain members from amonghis strong supporters.

The immediate task of this boardwas

t c;> ..~~J:~blis l;l .. rules. and . proGed l:l~~s . under. wl;l ich. t l;l e next
65Alessandri , p. 28; Iglesias , p.'

나‘~，
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nominating convention would select its presidential candidate.
The delegates divided into two distinct groups:
those who supported Alessandri ’ s candidacy and those who
oO
opposed ,it. 66

The latter declared that they would not

accept the decisions of the extreme left-wing faction ,
and they promptly withdrew from the Liberal Party and
from the Liberal Alliance , thus destroying its newly won
parliamentary majority.

The Rivas clique , which had lost

its position of pre-eminence within the Alianza organized
a'new alliance with Nationals , Balmacedistas , and a Radical splinter group.

This c.o"alition supported the candi-

dacy of either Tocornal or Barros Borgono. 67

The new

political combinations which resulted were the National
Union , formed by Conservatives , Democratic Liberals
(Balmacedistas) and Nationals , and the Liberal Alliance
made up ofRadicals , the majority of Liberals , and
crats. 68

De mo-

Alessandriwrote:
.. The error of those oppos ing my
candidacy , on separating themselves
from the party and from the Alliance ,
had very serious consequences for them.
They appearedto be abandoning their
doctrines.t9battlean.igdividual , one

66

The reformist faction , c6mposed of middle class
and provincial elements , followed Yanez and Alessandri ’ while the traditional faction was led by Tocornal , Vald~s
Valdes , and Barros Borgono.
67Donoso , p. 2셔 o.
68Alessandri·, p. 29.
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in whose hands they left the banner
of the Liberal Alliance which had
received great approval throughout
the coun try. .
I have said many times that ,
throughout my troubled political
career , usually I have reached the
highest positions , less by my own
effort than through the action of
my adversaries. More than ever , so
it was on this occasion: . gross was
the error of the members of Congress
who abandoned those who had elected
them in order to swell the ranks of
the opposition. Thus they opened， t 。
me the~doors of La Moneda~. : . .69
Once the board of directors had been selected , the
struggle over organization of the convention commenced.
Almost as soon as it began deliberations , the board found
itself divided:

one group supported a universal convention

in which all splinter groups of the old Liberal coalition
cOQld participate , while the other (backed by Alessandri)
maintained that the convention should not relinquish the
Aliancista banner but should admit onlythose delegates
who remained loyal to the party in the 1919 convention.
After much debate the plan for a closed convention prevailed and

~he

board fixed the number ofdelegates

allotted to each party and their qualifications. 70
Shortly before the scheduled opening of the
Alianza C.onvention Eliodoro

Ya더 ez

seized the offensive

69Alessandri , p. 30.
70 Ig l es ias , p. 3μ3.
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and toured thesouthern provinces , delivering a series of
speeches in which he explained the position of the Liberal
Alliance , and through which he hoped to gain support for
his own candidacy.
was a

no~el

This action by a coalition candidate

occurrence in Chilean electoral practice and

Yanez was·warmly praised for his initiative.
。 sity

Their curi-

aroused , the people gathered in considerable numbers

to hear the voice of the prestigious statesman , alth6ugh
his academic style , his quiet manner , and the wisdom of
his opinions did n6t excite the provincial audiences that
were eager for polemics and violent-oratory.
The Ya윈 ez tour was discussed heatedly by the close
circle of politicians who began to gather at Alessandri ’ S
house to prepare his candidacy.

All observed the urgent

necessity of a similar swing through the South by
Alessandri , and they were confident that the fieriness and
mettle of his speeches would a·ttract even larger crowds.
The senator agreed t.o the wisdom of such advice , but he
declined , stating that he did not havethe audacity to
appear in the same cities where Yanez had spoken without
having been specially invited.

A few days later from

Concepci6n , Alessandri received an invitation from the
president of the Radical Center "Juan Castellon" to deliver
a political lecture in the municipal theater.
obstacle was removed. 7l

*

Thus a major

At stations along.the route.members

71Arturo Olavarria Bravo , Chile ent 1:' e 브으E Alessandri ,
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。f

theparty greeted local leaders who approached the candi-

date to offer him their support.

The train arrived at

Concepci6n amid martial airs provided by the local band
and loud cheers for the "Lion of Tarapaca ,1T the "candidate
ofthe people ," the "future President of Chile."

The

enthusiasm of the multitude which struggled to approach and
embrace thecandidatewas tremendous , andwaiting at the

Alessandri was introduced by Juan Antonio R{os , who
noted that since Concepcion had heard Yanez , the Radical
Center believed that Has an act of true democracy" the
other leading contendeI’ for the nomination also shouldbe
heard.
。f

In his remarks Alessandri stated that the old guard

the Radical Party--those who earlier viewed his social

doctrines as

subversive~-now

understood that he was trying

to defend the public order by means of necessary evolution ,
and they had become enthusiastic supporters of his
daci. 72

candi~

(T~e traditionalists , led by Mac-Iver , had waged

a valiant holdingaction against the social-reform-oriented
young Radicals , but in the end they.were.overwhelmed and the
Memorias politicas , Vol. I , pp. 6μ-5.
Among the members of Alessandri ’ s retinue were the
R욕dical deputies Hector Arancibia Laso and Rafael Torreblanca ,
Victor Domingo Silva , the young journalist Guillermo Bianchi ,
the poet and orator Juli~ Cesar Barrenechea , Oscar Garces
Silva and Arturo Olavarrla Bravo , Alessandri t s private secretarv.
‘
72ALessandri , p. 31.

쌍
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Radical Party assumed a new leftist orientation.)
Alessandri delivered a lengthy and stirring oration , and
at the conclusion of the speech the audience gave him a
standing ovation.

The die was cast and Alessandri ’ s presi-

dential campaign was off to an auspicious start. 73
The echoes of the triumphant visit to Concepcion
spread throughout the southern region , and the people
wanted to listen to the senator in order to make comparisons.

In response to the rain of invitations that followed ,

Alessandri made a new tour , this time to Temuco , Valdivia ,.
Osorno , Puerto Montt , and returning by way of Chill&n.
tour , just as the first , was an unqualified success.

This
The

great majority of the Aliancistas of those provinces showed
that they preferred the valiant caudillo to the academic
。rator

Yanez.

In the words of Victor Domingo Silva ,
/

Alessandri ’ s cause spread "the word of 1 iberty and the
gospel of right. ，， 7μ

The presidential campaign broke the

traditional pattern of lavish promises made to effect local
improvement projects; it presented a brand new aspect which
the conservative elements equated with a first call to revolution.
The Convention of the Liberal Alliance opened
Ap~il.2S， .l920 ，

with

.the.~~gist~ation.of.more.th$n.l~OO

73Olavarria , p. 69.
7아

Cited in Olavarria , p. 71. The 'address was delivered at Temuco following a banquet in honor of the candidate.
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delegates in the Salon of Honor of the National Congress.
Among those assembled it was believed that the contest would
finally narrow to a battle between Yanez and Alessandri;
bets were placed and Eliodoro Y'5ez emerged with the best
dds. 75 ’ During the first session Armando Quezada

Achar~n ，

the headofthe Radical Party , was elected President of the
Convention.

The nomination balloting was to take place with-

in the framework established by previous nominating assemblies.

There were to be three free ballots , and then two

additional ones to decide among the three leading candidates.

The party membership agreed to vote in the first

and second rounds for their respective chiefs as was customary; however , on the first ballot Alessandri receiv C? d
nearly

μ00

votes.

Since no candidate approached the neces-

sary 60% majority , the delegates agreed to proceed to the
second round.

After having cast his vote , Alessandri made

his way through' the multitude toward the door , intending to
go hom.e and await the results of the balloting.

A short·time

later , his afternoon tea with his family was interrupted by
a disturbance at the door leading to the street.

The senator

went to investigate and was met by a noisy crowd of his supporters who had come to inform him that he had garnered more
than the necessary three-fifths of the v 。 tes . 76
75

용

Alessandri , p. 31; Iglesias , p. 3μ3.
76Alessandri noted that on the second ballot he
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According to his own account , Alessandri returned
to the convention hall and was received with thundering
applause.

He was lifted to the presidential rostrum where

Armando Quezada embraced him , then asked for silence.

He

declared that Arturo Alessandri had surpassed by far the
60% majority required for nomination in the by-laws of the
Convention , and therefore he was entrusting to the "Lion 1T
the standard of the Liberal Alliance , confident that he
would carry it to victory.

The delegates then demanded

that the nominee speak on his program.

Alessandri wanted

some time to think and to put his important points in
writing , but the delegates were -insistent.

Alessandri

rose to the podium and proceeded to develop his ideas as
they came to mind. 77
Alberto Edwards has said ,
Alessandri did not hesitate to tint
his candidacy with the colors of a
revolution without arms. He openly
declared war on all the formulas of
thepast , and even on the traditional
beginnings of middle class society.
He united in his program all the
affronts and dissatisfaction that
floated in the atmosphere ang_he
promised.to.remedy them all. 78
obtained more than 800 votes even though his closest friends
and the members of his family had not voted for him.
Alessandri , p. 33.
77
Alessandri , p.33.
78 Edwards , p. 210.
에i
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Thus it is difficult to define the precepts precisely and
to categorize them within a logical doctrine; it was a program of rebellion and protest rather than one of reconstruction.

Alessandri took strong exception to the views expressed

by Edwards; however , the document offered as the enunciation
of his program appeared years later with the considerable
advantage of hindsight. 79
In Donoso ’ s opinion:

"The program

~ontained

nothing

extreme; nevertheless , it alarmed the conservative classes.
cul~inating

In that

moment of his career , the versatile poli-

tician • . ..could not help but appe ar as the agi tator who
menaced those who might try· to block the way. ,80
"UV

attempt to change his image.

Nor did he

The concluding paragraphs of

Alessandri ’ s acceptance speech amounted to a parody of some
earlier presidential candidates who had characterized themselves as conci11iatory elements , threatening to no one·.
He said ,
I want to be a menace to the reactionaries , to those who resist all just and
necessary reform
I want to be a menace to those who rebel
against the principles of justice and right;
I want to be a menace to all who remain blind ,
deaf , and dumb in the presence of the tran~.:
formations of this historic moment . . . . 81

*

79 See A1essandri , pp.
80 Donoso , p. 2 아 3.
81t:A1essandri , p. μ39.
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On May 2 , 1920 , the opposition National Union met
in convention to nominate its candidate for President of
theRepublic.

The purpose of that assembly seemed to be

to select , not the best candidate forthe position , but
the best man to campaign against Alessandri.

Looming as

an unexpectedly strong candidate was Senator Enrique
Zaiiartu Prieto who , with the support of the Democratic
Liberals , Nationals and some Conservatives , almost secured
the necessary votes to be nominated.

The Liberal faction

that had opposed Alessandri favored the candidacy of Ismael
Tocornal , a man of vast experience in public affairs with
a solid and well-earned reputation.

However , his name did

not catch fire in the Convention; perhaps because of opposition from President Sanfuentes and Minister of Interior
Montenegro , both of whom had suffered political setbacks
at the hands of Tocornal.

Other contenders were" Guillermo

Subercaseaux , former Minister for France; Ladislao Errazuriz;
~rturo Besa , former "Minister of Foreign Affairs; Agustln

Edwards , Minister to London; and Luis Barros Borgo50.

The

balloting began on Sunday afternoon and by Tuesday it
appeared that the Convention might have to adjourn without
selecting a nominee.

Zanartu offered to withdraw but his

adherents were reluctant to give up the fight; the Tpcornal
and Barros factions seemed deadlocked.
gaγe

A last minute deal

the required two-thirds vote to Barros Borgono.

\,..
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Nearly seventy years of age , but appearing much
younger , Barros was a former law professor
position

。f

wh 。

had held the

Minister of Foreign Affairs at one time.

He also

had assumed a leading role 1n the 1ssue of public instruction ,
thereby incurring some hostility from the Catholic Church. 82
The nomination was applauded jubilantly by the delegates ,
but

n。

one rejoiced more than Alessandri.

point of

pr~ctical

From the vantage

politics , he believed Barros to be the

weaker candidate; he was known as an intellectual but he had

때

야

:
l

랴

never been a political activist. 83
n m ·’n .
t 。 the
Even p r ‘
·i

‘

conventions the metro-

politan newspapers had taken up positions for the impending
contest.
。f

One

the leading editorial writers on the staff

。f

El Mercurio , Joaqufr1 DfaZ Garc~s was a bitter critic

Alessandri.

。f

When that newspaper agreed to sell the Alianza

a page of advertising daily， 8μ Dfaz immediately resigned ,

charging publicly that El

the~conservative El

Diario Ilustrado , where he con-

tinued his attacks on Alessandri.
82
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was subsidized by the

He joined the staff of the President ’ s

Alessandristas.
。rgan ，

Mercuri。

E

by the ‘Alianza was rumored , to be
825.00/131 , Shea to Colby , May μ ，
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comment editorially on the presidential nominees , devoting
its columns to municipal affairs of the most minor significance.

(Donoso interprets this

poli~y

--keeping an ear to the ~round.)85

as one of indecision

YiBez ’ daily 관르 Naci6n ,

one of the most powerful papers in Chile , was devoid of
editorial commentary following Alessandri ’ s overwhelming
victory· in the Alianza Convention , although it regularly
sold a page of advertising to the National Union organiza.1__ 86
t1on.

The well-to-do segments of society expressed amazement and consternation over the easy win by the "Lion of
Tarapaca. 1t

Domingo Amunategui asked , '.'W hat new moral or

political currents had puffed up the middle classes so that
they dared have the audacity to.combat their former masters?"
The day following the nomination a further expression of
alarm appeared in the press in the form of an advertisement
paid for by the National Union.
Gates"the item concluded:
matter of
security.

s~preme

Entitled "Hannibal at the

"Men of position:

This is a.

national interest , of our own personal

Take steps to defend it!"

Manuel Rivas write

in his memoirs:
In the Club de la Uni6n , in banking
circles , among the earnest and
85 Donoso , p. 2 나 1.
86
~It was rumored that A1essandri had attempted a reconciliation but Ya건 ez refused to see him. DSF. 825.00/131 ,
Shea to Colby , May 니 , 1920.
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judicious people of the capital , the
Alessandri candidacy was madness; it
would be the final outlandish escapade
of a much-discussed individual. He
did not haVe the financial ~eans t 。
mount a campaign , he did not have a
majority in Congress , it was purer
nonsense. 87
A most interesting reaction was that of the Radical patriarch Enrique Mac-Iver , who still wielded considerable influence over his younger cohorts.

He did not

attend the convention , but from the first indication of
Alessandri ’ s possible candidacy , he was against it.

This

attitude alarmed the party leaders who sent a delegation
to try to persuade Mac-Iver to cease his opposition to the
Alianza candidate and to offer Alessandri his moral support.

The old Radical retorted ,
But don ’ t you know Alessandri? Don ’ t
you know that he is a most deceitful
Italian , personalistic and a friend of
the unconscious claptrap that there is
in the country? Are you sure that once
in the Presidency , although he may have
RadicalMinisters , he is not going to
surround himself with favori ties
supplanting you and forcing you to retire ,
upiess you~b~come corrupt ~ith him. . . 788
Donoso reiterated:
From the first , the "popular JT candidate
shook the sensibilities of the lower
classes with Messianic promises:
the
agit~tor， the destroyer , the demagogue
87

Cited in Donoso , pp.

2μ3-4.

88 Cited in Donoso , pp. 2μ7-8.
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was in his element. He promised the
destruction of capitalism and the
satisfaction of all the needs of the
working classes; he presented himself
as the paladin of social justice , the
liberator of the oppressed and the
redeemer of the downtrodden.
Early in the campaign Alessandri coined several phrases
that he was to use with considerable success.

He referred

to the wealthy classes as la canalla dorada (the gilded
rabble) , he cajoled the masses by calling them his chusma
Querida (beloved mob)

,

he repeated over and over that he

would be President of the Republic

E르프흐 르

quien

요르흐르

(that

is , let the chips fall where they may).
A decisive element in the fervor that engulfed the
populace was the attitude of the student youth , the

so~

called generation of 1920 , that saw Alessandri "as the
reformer of antiquated political customs and the representative of new social currents.

Youthful idealism and

altruis~，

plus the impact of the Russian Revolution , had brought a
degree of prestige and a modicum of success to the student
movement; and it was a potent force which could be easily
exploited by a man like Alessandri.
The new combination of parties that called itself
the National.Union received the vigorous support of the conservative factions.

Grouped on its side were the

ful economic forces of the country:
industry , and the propertied classes.

power-

banking , big business ,
Its organ ,

k‘
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Diario

5 5'
Ilustrado , reviewed the program of candidate Barros in
glowing terms:
It is like a comprehensive synthesis
of thatwhich all patriots would 'want
to see applied at all levels of national
activity. It does not try to dazzle with
excessive promises; it does not address
itself to the passions of any single class;
it indicates what is practically possible
。nthe roadto progress , in the concept of
a statesma다 A not as simply the demand of a
candidate.~ 'j

Campaign activity intensified during the month of
May.

Barros , after a brief round of receptions , banquets

~nd

organizational meetings in Santiago , went to Valparaiso

and then toured the southern part of the country , aided by
Ya전 ez ’

politial following.

The Union candidate did not

plan to invade the Alessandri stronghold in the northern
desert provinces.

From all appearances the Liberal Alliance

had the better organization , and a number of young men from
the upper class were supporting Alessandri enthusiastically;
but there was considerable talk of bribery and corruption.
?ublicly , Barros ’ partisans predicted a majority of at least
twenty in the Electoral College , 90 though privately they
agreed that if the election results were reasonably close ,
Congress would unseat a sufficient number of Alessandri
electors to insure the triumph of Barros.
89

Cited in Donoso , pp.

The Aliancistas

2 셔 6-7.

90 D$F. 825.00/l36 , Shea to Colby , June 1 , 1920.
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openly threatened revolution if their candidate weredenied
victory by such chicanery.91
Fr equent protests were made by adherents of both

groupsover opposition efforts to disrupt public meetings
and ev~n to attack thecandidates themselves.

In Concepci6n ,

Osorno , and other southern towns , gatherings to publicize the
Barros candidacy were interfered with and sometimes broken up.
Stones and other missiles were hurled at the nominee , but he
escaped injury.

Disturbances also occurred in connection with

Alessandrista meetings , and public officials were cited for
failure to prevent disorders and for unlawful interference
with the campaign.

Several intendants and minor officials

were removed , 92 but not before

the executive committee of

the Liberal Alliance had filed a formal complaint against
Minister of Interior Pedro Montenegro charging lax enforcement of.the law , and thereby had brought about another cabinet crisis.

The Ministers all tendered their resignations;

the Alianza repudiated its representatives and refused

t。

accept any" new cabinet integrated wi thout authorized Aliancista members.

It also demanded ample guarantees that the

91므SF. 825.00/132
0
r
I
, Shea to Colby , May 18 , 1920.
T"\C"tT:l
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92The intendant of Talca , a province south of
Santiago , was one of those called to La Moneda to answer
charges of interference. He was discharged for pernicious
’
activity and failure to perform his sworn duty. 므SF. 825.00/
136 , Shea to Colby , June 1 , 1920.
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government would not exert pressure during the impending
93
e1ection.~~ El Mercurio editorialized on June 18 , 1920:
The resignation of the Alliance Ministers was a necessary consequence of
the declarations of the Allied parties
and forces the President to look again
for new men to form the Cabinet , thus
making him responsible for the gravity
ofthe situation that may arise. The
situation is very seriol펴 and the necessity of having a responsible Government
becomes more urgent each day. It is
necessary to have a government with
ample and impartial foundation , in which
both tendencies may find effective guarante es , with men whose presence in the
Cabinet will inspire confidence to the
country . . . . This is an extreme case
in which we must proceed withenergy and
nobleness , consulting only the interests
of the country. Both candidates have an
equal interest in the prompt solution of
this situation , as a resigned Cabinet
cannot preside in the elections , not
having authority and responsibility for
suchacts.
•

관료

Naci6n , too , admitted the gravity of the political situ-

ationand in addition expressedconcern over Chile ’ s deteriorating position internationally in the absence of a functioning
Minister of Affairs.

The

is~Ue

of submitting the boundary

dispute with Peru to arbitration under the League of Nations
covenant had been resurrected and demanded immediate attentionJμ
93 Donoso , p. 2μ9; 원F. 825.00/138 , Shea to Colby , June 15 ,
퍼20.
The deciding votes포 or censure were cast by the electroliticos , an independent faction led by Manuel Rivas;
9μ

Cited in D햇. 825.00/139 , Shea to Colby , June 2μ ， 1920 ,
translated by the Embassy staff.' Shortly thereafter; Finance
Minister Viera Gallo was moved to the Foreign Affairs post.
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The leading Santiago dailies continued to display
,

relative neutrality in their editorial columns , although
each regularly ran pages of propaganda paid for by the
opposing political organizations.
。wner

of

펀

The Edwards family ,

Mercurio , received considerable criticism for

its mercenary attitude and lack of patriotic spirit in the
face of the Alessandri t ’ anarchist menace. 1T
Opini6n , and

프L

La Union ,

맡르

Diario Illustrado continued their bitter

assaults on the Aliancista candidate and his platform ,
both in editorials and in the news columns; and the most
influential newspapers in Valparaiso pursued the same line.
In the outlying provinces , though , the papers were about
evenly divided in their political views; almost every small
town had two newspapers:

one that was Liberal or Democrat

and the other Conservative or

De mocrat

Liberal. 95

As election day approached , the intensity and
violence of the struggle increased; and the frequent public
statements--fraught with emotion--which were made by the
leaders of both sides , revealed how deeply dividedthe partisans were.

The war in the press narrowed to a bitter debate

overthe popular candidate , his program , and the sincerity
‘

withwhichhe defended his proposals.
On June 13 , 1920 , as A1essandri was addressing a
“

large crowd fromthe balcony of his home , two shots were fired
95See DSF’. 825.00/136 , Shea to Colby , June 1 , 1920; 쁘 F.
825.00/138 , S끊급 to Colby , June 15 , 1920.
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in his direction by a plainclothes policeman.

The candi-

date ’ s supporters insisted that the bullets were intended
for him (one of the shells later was found imbedded in the
balcony woodwork)

,

while the opposition claimed that the

officer was trying to defend himself from those in the hostile crowd who had .d iscovered his presence in their rnids t.
The incidentwas all but ignored in the newspapers , and
government officials tried to pass over the matter as
lightly as possible. 96
The following week , 딛르 Naci6n published an article
accusing the Aliancistas of having committed a long list of
。 utrages

during the course of the campaign.

Among these

wereattempts to counteract demonstrations favoring Barros
by following them up with deliberate disorders perpetrated
by Alessandri supporters; the incidents cited were in Vina
del Mar , Coltauco , Putaendo , and in Los Angeles where a
fatality occurred. 97
One issue , injected into the campaign at the eleventh hour , promised to provoke serious results , at least
96VnSF.
n
~
825.00/130
, Shea to Colby , June 13 , 1920; DSF.
825.00/138 , Shea to Colby , June 15 , 1920. Ambassador She륨→
repDrted having dined with the Foreign Minister on the evening following the shooting. The event was discussed in a
general way , "but nobody seemed to attach particular importance to it. 1T Shea also related that fears of serious
casualties occurring before or on election day had been
expressed in all circles.
97 nSF. 825.00/139
O l'\~
, Shea to Colby , June 2μ ， 1920.
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for a time.

From the Unionista page of

훤l

Mercurio grave

charges were leveled against Alessandri concerning pending
litigation with the National Bank of Chile.

Some years

before , the candidate had borrowed a large sum of money and
had pledgedas collateral shares of stock in .Llallagua , a
Chilean-owned mining property located in Bolivia.

When the

bank demanded payment , Alessandri authorized sale of the
stock , but the amount realized was insufficient to satisfy
the bank ’ s claim.

At the heighth of the campaign the bank

insisted on a subsequent payment of 680 , 000 pesos , which
Alessandri refused to make on the grounds that the bank
had allegedly accepted the stock -as full settlement in the
first place.

Furthermore , in the intervening years the

stock had increased considerably in value , so Alessandri
brought suit against the bank for three million pesos , the
difference between the original value of the stock and its
current value less the amount of the original debt.

He

based his action on the grounds that the sale was invalid
because the written authorization had not been properly
notarized.
During the progress of the litigation , a ruling
adverse to Alessandri was made by the court; and a review
of the decision plus a replica of Alessandri ’ s lette l:‘ with
some damaging implications were printed in the newspaper.
The following day a scathing rebuttal appeared in the

l.
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columns of the A1iancista advertisement.
。 ther

It stated , among

things , thatthe court decision in question had been

。btained

through the influence of a bank official who was

also a counselor of state.

This accusation caused a mild

sensation , because the only man holding the two positions
was Carlos Balmaceda , a man of some prestige and a nephew
。f

the former President of the Republic.

satisfaction , the representative of El

Balmaceda demanded

Mercuri。

disclaimed

responsibility for the article , the Liberal Alliance Committee refused to accept responsibility and thereby lost
its opportunity tobuy space in the paper.

After this

impasse the furor subsided as quickly as it had arisen ,
and the matter seemed to be closed. 98
Throughout his campaign tours , Alessandri repeatedly
had proclaimed the extent of his poverty , and had heralded
the enthusiasm of his partisans as compensation for the
scantiness of his resources.

In reality , his campaign

coffershad been filled generously , and his brother Jose
Pedro contributed a sizable portion of his personal funds
to the Alessandri cause.

The National Union candidate also

had abundant resources , and he risked a considerable part
of his personal fortune as well. 99
,

98.월프.
. . . ,...'T""'I 825.00(138
"',.. "''' I
, Shea to Colby , June 15 , 1920.
99
。， p. 251.
The campaign funds spent on behalf
of each nominee exceeded three million pesos.
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The serious unrest apparent throughout Chilean
society , especially among the laboring groups , was manipulated by the Aliancistas , but certainly was not of their
creation.

Congress had convened the first of June but

ignored the urgent matter of the conversion law , and there
was a general demand in the press for enactment of some
100
measure to stabilize the currency.LVV

Workmen were faced

with high living costs that continued to climb steadily
higher , inadequate wages and miserable working conditions.
There were threats of strikes in the coal mines of the
south and in the nitrate regions of the north.
a shortage in the bean

c~op ，

their basic food

,

Because of
the dock

workers refused to load beans for shipment overseas.

There

was a shortage of 150 , 000 tons in the wheat harvest , also ,
andthe government considered an embargo on wheat exports.
Thelack of adequate food and other necessities caused real
suffering among the Chilean masses , and the political turmoil merely added to their difficulties.
Coal production had dropped about twenty percent ,
due primarily to the efforts of professional labor agitators ,
and thefuel situation became acute.
100............

DS 닫.

Lights had to be turned

，..，..~..........，

825.00/138 , Shea to Colby , June 15 , 1920. The
problem of cheap paper money dates back to 1892. By 1914 there
was much sentiment on the part of the landowners to return to
a metallic standard , but the dislocation produced by World War
I made conversion unfeasible.
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off tosave electricity and restrictions were placed on the
use of gas for cooking.

All demonstrations by the miners

were suppressed , yet workmen ’ s organizations increased their
demands for shorter hours and higher wages.

A labor delega-

tion sent to Santiago to present the case for the miners
contended that the menwere working eight hours a day and
were not attempting to curtail production.

The representa-

tives claimed that the owners were stockpiling coal at the
mines in anticipation of higher prices.

The

~ompanies

then

intended to provoke a new strike to justify military measures in the coal region during the presidential elections ,
thereby hindering the free expression and action of the
mlners.
The situation grew so grave that the contending
political groups agreed upon a pre-arranged division of
electoral votes in the mining districts without reference
to the actual election returns.

In the province of

Concepci6n , Alessandri was to obtain twenty-four votes
Such an agreement , in

while Barros was to get twelve.

spite of the bitter struggle between the factions , gave
evidence ofthe genuine concern felt by both sides over
the very real possibility that the disorders might escalate to near anarchy.10l
101......... _
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In Santiago on election eve , the casual observer
would have concluded that there was only one candidate for
the office of President of the Republic.
。f

The supporters

Arturo Alessandri Palma held almost continuous demon-

strations in the streets; and in the vicinity of the candidate ’ s home on the Alameda still more cheering followers ,
drawn largely from the laboring class , maintained their
vigil.
Election day , June 25 , dawned in an atmosphere of
apprehension and turbulence.

The Aliancista voters , obey-

ing the instructions of the party leadership , appeared at
the polls during the early morning hours and cast their
ballots; and they then proceeded to organize themselves
into crews for the avowed purpos·e of observing the voting
to insure an honest election.

According to Donoso , these

poll watchers assaulted opposition officials , intimidated
the voters , frightened the populace , and provokeddisorders
which the local police were unable to control.
reportof the results

ga~e

The first

179 electors to Alessandri. and

175 to Barros; however , the Ministers left La Moneda that
~ight.w~thout.providing official information.l~2

102
oso , p. 251; DSF’ • 825.00/153 , Shea to Colby ,
July 9 , 1920. The accoun는-Sy the American Ambassador
stated that election day , a legal holiday , passed quietly.
Only a few incidents marred the balloting , and those were
characterized as unimportant.
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Thefo1lowing morning on its Alianza page , El
Mercurio ran a large photograph of Alessandri with a captionstating that he had been elected.

The next day on

the Unionista page Barros was declared the winner.

The

government issued no official statement; unofficially it
claimed that the returns were not yet complete.

This

failure to announce the election results appeared to
arouse much resentment among the lower class supporters
of Alessandri , and the Committee of the Liberal Alliance
called a meeting of Alessandristas for one

0

’ clock Sunday

afternoon (June 27 , 1920) in the Plaza de Armas.

Als 。

scheduled for the same hour in City Hall on the Plaza was
th e. meeting of the Electoral College of the Department of
Santiago.
To preserve order and control the milling masses
who had paraded the streets throughout the night , mounted
police and mounted carabineros armed with rifles and
. lances were stationed at all streets entering the Plaza.
The officerin comm'and was to permit. no invasion of the
Plaza , and as an additional precaution several machine
gunswere placed in strategic locations.
Shortly before the hour of the meeting the
Aliancistas formed their procession , and with banners
flying and posters of Alessandriheld high they marched
toward the Plaza.

The carabineros met the parade and

\"
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halted it , and hostilities ensued at once.

The officers

finally charged the crowd which was growing by the minute ,
and in the meleeseveral demonstrators were injured.

The

multitude quickly dispersed , only to regroup in front of
Alessandri ’ s residence on the Alameda.

The numbers swelled

rapidly and so did the animosity toward the police.
μ:00

About

P.M. the mob returned to the vicinity of the Plaza and

attacked the carabineros with sticks and stones.

The

soldiers defended themselves wi th admirable restrain t
,

,

although several of the contingent were wounded--one seriBefore the crowd retreated , a number of demonstrators also had suffered injuries. 103

ously.

Immediately after the clash , Alessandri was observed
walking through the streets with a small group of followers
assuring the crowds that he had been elected , and this
seemed to be interpreted by his partisans as a signal
cease creating

10μ

disturbances.Lu~

t。

Later the same afternoon

Alessandri addressed an enormous gathering in f-ront of his
house; the'contents of his speech were reported by an
American who was present in the crowd.

The candidate reit-

erated that he had been elected , that the government was
deliberately holding back the news ,. and that he was delivering an ultimatumfor an official announcement within
103펀료
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forty-eight hours.

Alessandri predicted that if the govern-

ment refused to acknowledge his election or if he were
assassinated , another messiah would rise to lead the Chilean
people to ultimate triumph.

The cause of the Alianza was

just and was bound to succeed , he said , while the cause of
the rich aristocrats who had made slaves of the masses for
80

long was surely doomed.

He concluded his remarks with

a plea to remain calm throughout the two-day period ahead.
After the deadline , if the government had not proclaimed
his election , he would consent to demonstrations of any
magnitude. lOS

The speech further ~roused the fervor of

the audience , but the Alessandristas acquiesced to the
wishes of their leader and finally dispersed.
Sunday night the streets were comparatively quiet
with no large crowds parading , although a sizable gathering
maintained the vigil in front of Alessandri ’ s home.

The

mounted police and carabineros remained at their stations
along principal streets and at the entrance to the Plaza
de Armas.
trams and

~onday

buss~s

continued calm , shops remained closed ,

halted operations , and few private con-

veyances were to be seen.

A general strike was declared

in Santiago , and Alessandristas held scattered parades but
there were no disorders.

Unofficial statements by govern-

ment officials still claimed incomplete returns.
lO SDSF. 825.00/153 , Shea to Colby , July 9 , 1920.
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Information from numerous sources indicated that
on Tuesday afternoon , while throngs of partisans continued
to block the Alameda and to create a potential disruptive
force , Alessandri received word that since he was responsible for'the strike and disorders , he would be considered
guilty of disturbing the peace if he did not counsel his
followers to disband and return "to work.
According to the rumor , he was to comply with the
suggestion before 5:00 P.M.

At that hour , if the crowd

had not dispersed , the carabineros would be instructed

t。

c'harge wi th lances drawn , and Alessandri would be arrested
for having caused the disturbances.

It was evident that

Alessandri was influenced in some manner , for he spoke to
the assembled throng that afternoon and urged them to
return homeand go back to their jobs.
the assurance that , in fact , he had been

He also renewed
106

e1ected~

i

............ ... J....... _.
_ •.
_. _ . __ ~
825.00/153 , Shea to Colby , July 9 , 1920.
Shea reported that he could not verify the rumor.
106___
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V.

THE TRIBUNAL OF HONOR

The second phase of the electoral experience had
begun.

Unlessone of the candidates received an absolute

majority of electors , the full Congress would make the
final determination , and Barros Borgofio enjoyed a comfortable margin in both chambers.

Inthe face of that possi-

bility , Alessandri began to claim that the government
intended torob him of the electionby disqualifying a
sufficient number of electors.

He appealed to his chusma

Querida from the balconies of his home , keeping them
stirred up and ready for action.

In the week following

the election , Santiago lived under threat of mob violence;
numerous rumors circulated , and the well-to-do elements
took steps to form a vigilantetype organization to protect
107
property and maintain order if such should become necessary.
Businesses remained closed

,

traffic was non-existent , indis-

pensable services and supplies were cut off.

In Donoso ’ S

view , the Alessandristas wanted to carry fear and anguish

t。

every home in the city; they spread the rumor that thedistrict
would be surrendered to looting , whereupon bands of
invaded the area.
Alia~za，

Over the signature of the directors of·the

telegrams.were

107 T'\n~
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transmitted to the provinces
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, Shea to Colby , July 9 , 1920.
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much dependence upon the unfaltering loyalty of the military
establishment. 109
Both political combinations held to the claim of a
majority of electors; and Alessandri demanded recognition
。f

his victory , while the.National Union pleaded for an end

to the popular agitation.

Furthermore , both groups agreed

that a change in the Ministry was imperative.

Under the

pressure of a very grave situation , President Sanfuentes
108 Donoso , p. 252.
1.09DSF . 825.00/153 , Shea to Colby , July 9 , 1920; nSF’ •
to Colby , July 1 , 1920. Shea suggested
that a visit by an American battleship or two on or about
August 1 might have a salutary effect. He also reported
strict enforcement of government censorship to minimize
the importance of recent disorders. The American representative of Associated Press was permitted to send tw 。
telegrams to New York , then informed that future messages
would have to be examined before being sent.
The papers of the Argentine consul in Santiago were
cancelled by the Chilean Government because he allegedly
acted as news correspondent for a Buenos Aires newspaper and
sent out alarmist accounts of election disturbances. New
￥or￥ Times , July μ , 1920 , I I , 1: 2 .
---The Chilean legation in Buenos Aires had received n 。
news of the outcome of the elections. The American Minister
at La Paz had received reports from Buenos Aires that Chile
was in a state of revolution. He wired the American Embassy
in Santiago for verification.
825.00/l3~Shea
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organized a new Cabinet made up entirely of Liberals including representatives of both the Liberal Alliance and the
National Union.

This Ministry , headed by Pedro Garc{a de

la Huerta , was presented to the Congress on July 1 and
was well received. 110

The following day 환 Mercuri。 edito-

rialized:
F’。ITIler Senat。r d 。n Pedr。 Garcfa de la

Huerta has succeeded in forming a new
Cabinet composed of three Liberals of
the Alliance. and three Liberals of
the Union. Senor Garcla de la Huerta
has a political personality which meets
with sympathy and respect in both political groups. The other ministers are all
men ofprestige and authority in the
groups to which they belong .
Both political groups feel that their
rights will be properly upheld by this
Cabinet , because each has in it an active
and duly authorized director of the late
electoral campaign.
We are in urgent need of getting back
to normal again , so that the Government
may move forward again , legislation be
promoted and social unrest be avoided~
The writer concluded with a plea for support from all po1it-‘i. c 라 D‘ artie를】끄1‘

The next step in the electoral process was the casting
。f

ballots by the provincial electors in the capital of each

province on July 25. 112

After the electαrs had voted the

Congress appointed a joint committee to study all details of
ll0Donoso ,

253.
lllris~. 825.00/153 , Shea to Colby , July 9 , 1920 , translated by the Embassy· Staff.
•I
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the election , including claims of alleged frauds.
,

If some

electors were found to beillegally chosen , they were disqualified and their votes were deducted from the totals.
The Chilean Constitution provided that a presidential candidate must receive an absolute majority of the total number
of electors in order to be declared President; the magic
number was 178.

If no candidate received the required num-

ber of votes , Congress met in joint session and by a majority
elected the President from among the candidates.

The quorum

was made up of nineteen senators and sixty deputies , and a
decision had to be made by this body.113
Claimsand

counter~claims，

accusations and diatribes

contiqued to fill the press , and the animosity whipped up by
the Alessandristas produced a state of near panic ampng the
upper

classes~

Gradually a movement developed to form a

Court of Honor composed of prominent men of both.coalitions
who would study the conflicting claims against electors and
have been recognized by the electoral college of each department ashaving been duly elected. Such colleges were formed
of the assembled chairmen of the polling booths and they
issued to each elector an attested copy~of the act of his
election. The electoral colleges were not empowered to decide
。 n the legality of such acts , but they placed on record any
claims against the certification of aparticular elector.
113..........
n n ~
r\,... /
nSF. 825.00/153
, Shea to Colby , July 9 , 1920. The
deadline 륜or a decis'ion 펴 as set at Augu닙 t 30~ and in the event
agreement was not reached by that date , an extension of time
was possible by means of a joint act of Congress.
"r'I
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had prepared an editorial discounting the importance of the
event and its impact on Chile , which was to appear the following morning.

At the last moment the editorial was

rewritten , presumablyat the suggestion of the government ,
and the published piece was in an entirely different vein.
After commenting that the revolution was most regrettable
and would serve to strengthen the opinion of the outside
world that South America was

H

a mass of comic opera coun-

," the article went on to review the history

tries • • •

of Chile ’ s recent relations with the two neighboring
nations and it concluded with a call to the country to
settle the internal politi6al divergence so as to be free
to devote all energy to what might become a serious international problem. 115

La Naci6n and El Diar fo Ilustrado

carried similar editorials that day.

Ambassador Shea

reported that a visit to the Foreign Office on July 14
‘

conveyed to him the impression that the Chilean Government
considered the situation serious.

Officials frankly stated

that troops were being sent to the frontier as a precautionary measure in view of the fact that Peru also was known to
have massed about 10 , 000 soldiers close to the border.
Ext.ensive coverage of the international situation
continued to appear in the newspapers , and the fact that
the Bolivian army had sided with the revolutionists increased
115___
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the importance
opinion

1n

treaty of

。f

the movement and strengthened Chilean

the belief that itwas directed against the
190μ

and the former friendly policy toward

Furthermore , declarations emanating from Bolivia

Chile.

inferred the existence of a scheme by the governments of
Peru and Bolivia to take advantage of the deep social and
political divisions

1n

Chile by beginning an action which

would permit the former to recover Tacna and Tarapaca , and
the latter Antofagasta. 116

Another possibility was that

Peru might be able to force mediation
The strengthening of troops
ally approved by the people ,

1n

。f

1n

the dispute. 117

the north was gener-

as much as the government

had been under fire for some time because of its seemingly
indifferent attitude toward the proper defense of Chile's
northern frontier.

The F’ irst Division was promptly moved

north and members of the reserve classes

。f

1913 through 1919

。

(of the First and Third Divisions) residing 1. n the four north---‘
118 The government also announced
ern p‘ r v n c e s were called UD.
‘-’ •
it was recalling officers then abroad as members of

IT‘ ilitary

116 Donoso , p. 25μ . In 1919 , the National Assemb1y of
Peru had declared null and void the Treaty of Anc6n which had
established peace between Peru and Chile in 188μ"so a state
of war still existed.
117DSF’. 825.00/15μ， Shea to Colby , July 23 , 1920.
‘
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119

Foreigners living in Chile were required to register
--Peruvians first , and business houses were urged to discharge
Peruvians in their employ and advise them to leave Chile immediatel ’' y.120
The Chilean populace responded enthusiastically to
the apparent threat from her neighbors and the resulting
measures taken by the authorities.

Patriotic demonstrations

were organized and parades were held almost daily , halfholidays were declared , and there developed an attitude
unity of purpose before a possible danger.

~f

The strikes in

the north and the agitatiQn in the coal mines subsided , and
working men generally showed a desire to help during a time
of crisis.

There were some murmurings , however , to the

effect that the government had created an emergency to divert
public attention from the internal political strife. 121

The

notable exception to the nationwide expression of patriotic
f~rY9r w~~

119

the

res~onse

뾰w 프E프 꽉뾰효，

of the studegt groups and the more
July 17 , 1920 , 3:7.

120 DSF.
-nl'"'l
n n ~
n n I
825.00/1μ1 ， Alusna Valparaiso to Navintel ,
July 21 , 1920. Anti-Peruvian sentiment increased and there
were demonstrations and disturbances in several northern
towns. The press contributed to the problem by printing
accounts of the harsh treatment received by Chilean nationals
in Peru. 므SF. 825.00/15셔， Shea to Colby , July 23 , 1920.
l21
n n ~
nn I
·"'.&..DSF’. 825.00/15μ，
Shea to Colby , Ju1y 23 , 192q; D~F.
825.00/1μ~Shea to Colby , July 2 나， 1920; nSF. 825.00/14~
Deichman (Valparaiso) to Colby , July 25 , 19"흥δ.
T:I

T"\l'"'IT:I

"'-'~.l~냉잉-λR‘

77

radical labor leaders.
a

They viewed the entire situation as

bourgeois trick to swindle Alessandri of his just victory

and assure the presidency
period

t。

Barros Borgono.

During this

intense emotional reactions three unfortunate

。f

incidents

。 ccurred ，

each with the complicity or indiffer-

ence of the authorities.
One target for the hatred of the conservative
classes was the F’ederation of Students.
Minister

According to the

Public Instruction ( in a speech before the Sen-

。f

ate) , those students "had offended m,orality and had been
guilty of grave disrespect for the constitutional powers
of the state. ’,,122

The student group was well known for

its socialist tendencies; it had protested against the
military measures and had sent a comm1ss1on to Sanfuentes
to demand an explanation of the mobilization.

Both the

president of the Student ’ g F’ ederation and the former PR
dent (who was the editor

。f

R

----

>

an anarchist sheet called The

Red Message which had been suppressed) had made frequent
incendiary speeches against the government , had been strong
supporters

ot

Alessandri , and had instigated many of the

recent disorders.

The headquarters of the organ ization ,

located 1n the center of Santiago , was assaulted at midday
on July 21 while the police observed from the sidelines.

Alfredo

ι
훌
!

껴‘

’L 2

Dm

nue m

o
S/l

a

p. 25 나. Its lead~rs were Juan Gandulfo ,
Pedro Leon Loyola , and Carlos Vicuna.

78
Furniture was hurled to the street and burned , and the students who were trapped in the house had to flee via the
rooftops of adjacent buildings to escape the fury of the
mob.

Three days later , the Federation was dissolved by

government decree 123
That same night during demonstrations by two different crowds--one favoring the students and one -opposing
them--shots were exchanged; and a young member of the
aristocracy , Julio Covarrubias Freire , was killed and
eral other participants were wounded.

sev~

Donoso suggested

that the incident could have been a deliberate attempt at
intimidation.12μ

The destruction by arson of the Federaci6n

Obrerade Magallanes took place

~uly

27 , with the coopera-

tion of civil and military authorities.

One policeman and

four workers were killed and the building was burned to the
ground.

The reaction in political circles was intense , and

a protest work stoppage of five days contributed to rising
partisan emotions.
In Santiago the last week in July , the Chamber of
Deputies was engulfed in a heated debate over a bill to
appropriate five million pesos for mobilization ,. another
123Donoso , p. 255; 펀E· 825.oo/l5μ， Shea to Colby ,
JuLy 23 , 1920.
12μDonoso， p. 256.

Throughout the night other disorders occurred. mostly demonstrations against Peru. DSF.
825.00/15μ， Shea to Colby , July 23 , 1920.
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instance of fortuitous timing.
gress

뾰브

Later sessions of the Oon-

consider the tragic events in Punta Arenas where ,

following the disorders , the courts had taken repressive
action and had convicted and sentenced to prison a large
number of workers , students , and other Alessandri sympa125

thizers.L~J

Within Chile , all of these events generated

more ill will toward thegovernment; and from without ,
they brought much unfavorable publicity along with some
expressions of indignation and concern. 126

Peruvian refu-

gees arriving in Lima reportedthat the situation in Chila
verged on revolution , and travelers (American and European)
verified the stories of rioting and killings.
After the situation in Bolivia had stabilized and
the fears of imminent conflict with Peru had eased somewhat ,
attention of Chileans turned once again to internal politics
and the presidential elections.

Both sides awaited the next

step in the electoral process--the review of the voting by
. Congress--which was set for the 30th of August; however ,
serious efforts were still being made to have the election
reviewed by an impartial independent body.

It was generally

125 Donoso , p. 256.
126 One of the most famous victims was the poet ,
Domingo G6mez Rojas. Another , a Dr. Ducci--professor of
medicine and a former president of the Federation of Students--was upheld by the Board of Public Instruction after
the government had tried to remove him.
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believed that a partisan decision would not be accepted by
the populace , especially in view of the fact that the results
。f

the election amounted to a virtual·tie.

Alessandri con-

sidered himself sure of a victory and he welcomed the organization of a Tribunal of Honor; while some of his staunchest
。 pponents ，

among them Enrique Zaffartu , acquiesced to.a com-

promise because of the distinct possibility of international
conflict.

Meanwhile , as further insurance , Alessandri had

been carefully lining up in his camp the army , both officers
and enlisted men.

He sent Bernardo Gomez Solar to Antofa-

gasta for this purpose (intelligence from Tacna indicated
that the large body of troops quartered in that area were
considered to be safely in the Aliancista fold).

In his

memoirs , Manuel Rivas affirms having seen uniformed army
。fficers

at Alessandri ’ s house , indicating that the candi-

date had close dealings with officers on active duty.
Negotiations began between the two political

fac~

tions for the purpose of establishing the Supreme Court as
the Tribunal , but after laborious discussions the idea was
discarded. 127
The Cabinet continued its search for a conciliatory
127The Liberal Alliance refused to accept the Supreme
Court as such a tribunal unless some of the judges were
changed. It then suggested that the President of the Senate
designate three men and the Chamber of Deputies elect three ,
with the Archbishop of Santiago.as presiding office~. The
National Union refused both proposals. D를F. 825.00/165 ,
Sheato Colby , August 20 , 1920.
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solution but to Manuel Rivas went the credit for finally
breaking the impasse.

On August8 the seven independent

deputies known as electroliticos , who completed the consti/

tutional quorum necessary before Congress could act , declared
thatthey would boycott the joint session unless agreement
was reached to guarantee proper and just certification of the
presidential election. 128

Negotiations continued and the

representatives of both political coalitions finally estab1ished the working rules for the Tribunal but failed to
agree upon the composition of the court.

Alessandri pro-

posed the names of Isrnael Tocornal and Emiliano Figueroa ,
who would then designate a third arbiter to constitute the
Tribunal.

The National Union issQed a statement on August

10 approving the ideaand the next day the Liberal Alliance
concurred.

The two suggested names were accepted; also

added were those of the presidents of the two Chambers ,
Fernando Lazcano and Ram6n Briones Luco.

The written

agreement between the two factions was signed on August '21.
There was still evident resistance to the idea of impartial
judges , particularly by Lazcano whose determined opposition
to Alessandri was no secret.

The Senate President had

launched the Lion in politics many years earlier; but in
1920 Alessandri seemed to him a Bolshevik , an advocate of
s 9V iet. ~ ocial i Stn and. an anathema. t.o. a metnOer. of the. old
128 Donoso , p. 257.
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the four accepted arbiters reached

agreement on three more , thus completing the membership of
the Tribunal
i

。f

f

a

Honor.

To Luis Barros

Borgon。

the approval

formula for’ the makeup and the deliberations

with serenity of spirit and
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all his hopes , "and

valor he faced his

bitter situation. H129
In his

。，wn

verslon

the negotiations Alessandri

。f

relates:
I then approached Manuel 뀔 ivas Vicuna ,
who defended this solution /creation of the
Tribunal! with special ener향， and I suggested to him the following as a formula
for him to propose: the President of the
Senate , Lazcano; the President of the
Chamber of Deputies , Briones Luco; and the
two former Vice-Presidents of the Republic
who were alive , Tocornal and F’ igueroa.
These four would appoint to complete the
Tribunal Armando Quezada , Guillermo Subercaseaux , and former justice of the Supreme
Court Luis Barriga.
When my cohorts got hold of the names
that.were circulating as possible members
of the Tribunal , and without knowing that
I was the one who proposed them , they
shouted to high heaven complaining that of
the seven members who were to make up the
Tribunal , five were partial to Luis Barros
Borgono and only two--Briones Luco and
Quezada--to me. Ikept secret the information that the men had been suggested t 。
Rivas by me , and I was very pleased at the
uproar from my side , since that facilitated
the difficult task of obtaining acceptance
。f the names.
The National Union would
~~cept.pnly those.men.~~o inspired.confidence ,
s ·t
•

%
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p. 259; DSF. 825.00/158 , Shea to Colby ,
nSF. 825퍼δ/159 ， Shea to Colby , August 25 ,
,
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and the names that Rivas proposed
inspired confidence precisely because
。f the quality of the men and also
because of the resistance which those
names encountered in the ranks of the
Alianza Liberal. l30
On August 30 , before the Tribunal had hardly begun
its deliberations , Fernando Lazcano collapsed and died in
the salon of the Senate building.

Donoso commented ,

There is in his death anemotionprovoking symbol: it is the fall of
the oligarchy that had governed the
country for so many years. He , the
genuine representative of the traditional families , . . ,. saw as
inevitable the triumph of his protege
• caught up in the whirl of social
and ideological currents he scorned and
failed to understand.
The Senate rendered homage to its former President; then
Vice-PresidentAbraham Ovalle assumed his duties and

als 。

his position on the Tribunal. 131
Whilethe Tribunal continued its deliberations ,
news of labor unrest and political agitation regularly
reached the headlines.

In Valparaiso a government inves-

tigation discovered the headquarters of an IWW organization ,
the group that had fostered the strike of longshoremen and
had carried on an active propaganda campaign in Punta
Arenas •.. Ttre. authorities . eng~ged "in a

vigo~o l:l s"

program of

130Alessandri , p. "52.
131Donoso , p. 260.
servative Party.

Ovalle" was a member of the Con-

8μ

suppression; foreigners were deported , and Chileans
convicted of offenses against the government received sentences varying from five to twenty years.

The continuing

strife in Congress prevented the proper consideration of
legislative proposals which could have improved the conditions of the lower classes.

(The acute dissatisfaction

was not limited to the laborers , either , but was expressed
in most circles.)

Another Cabinet crisis added to the

difficulties experienced by President Sanfuentes , and
although the Alianza Ministers withdrew their resignations , the political atmosphere remained tense.

Troops

were kept mobilized in the northern provinces in the face
of mounting criticism , even though reports emanating from
Peruand Bolivia made ridiculous .the idea of an impending
invasion of Chile.

Isolated attacks on Peruvian property

continued , andclose to 500 nationals had already returned
to Peru or were preparing to do so at the first opportunity.
Thus the last months of the Sanfuentes administration were
marred by protest , violence , repression , and (in the opinion
of some) persecution.

The only bright spot on therecord

was the passage of the compulsory primary

educa~ion

law the

end~of August. 132

During the month of September the Tribunal of Honor
h~~Q← 4aily.sessions.~nd.heard.representatives.of
e acb.side

132 Donoso , p. 261.
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in every contested case.

N。

official statements were made

+L

that

·’
L

eg u
。

n

옆

Most of the gaily papers

，잉

of rumors.

때

concern1ng the decisions , but there were le·aks and plenty

larities had been discovered 1n the returns from Antofagasta; the official envelopes and seals had been falsified. 133
The Tribunal was approaching the end of its task ,

r
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with only a few of the southern departments still to be

ι

‘

’‘

•

‘ι

examined , when Subercaseaux announced his resignation and

‘

￥

}

r

Tocornal followed su1t.

‘

The reason

σ。

;

tg

·’v
l
i

때

r
1

was that Suber-

!

caseaux had been approached by members of the National
Union who tried

t。

pressure.him into taking a partisan

position on the Tribunal 1n defense of Barros Borgano.
He contended that his place was to see that a just deci홉 ion

was reached , and he bitterly denounced the criticism

directed aga1nst his vote on several contests.
devoted much space
。f

t。

The press

the matter , and the earlier feeling

optimism turned to despair.

Barros made

n。

statement;

133
Chilean electoral law provided thatcertificates
。 f results from each district must be drawn up on special
paper bearing the seal of the Senate and must be delivered
in envelopes sealed in the same manner. The paper was distributed shortly before the election to theproper electorat authorities by the Fiscal officers ofeach department.
This procedure was established in order to prevent falsified returns in instances where all the electoraljudges
belonged to one political combination. Only one certificate
~as provided , and it was signed by all the judges and political representatives presenf. It- could not be-altered
easily , and a duplicate would be detected. 펀 F. 825.00/173 ,
Shea to Colby , September 17 , 1920.
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however , Alessandri immediately announced he had every
confidence 1n the integrity of the members of the Tribunal
and he was certain a verdict would be reached without any
influence from either political faction.
the urging

。f

The next day , at

Liberal and independent deputies , Antonio

Huneeus agreed to head a committee to attempt to solve the

명

them that their position was correct:

바

The group wrote letters to both judges a s s

crisis.

·1
i

l

their duty on the

Tribunal was to reach a decision without regard for party
affiliation.

Subercaseaux and Tocornal agreed to wi thdraw

their resignations and the Tribunal was able to resume its
labors. 13μ

댄

On the m

--L

of September 30 a rumor‘ circulated

that the court would render its decision that day , and
throughout the afternoon a large crowd waited 1n front of

verdict 1n favor

。f

σ。

핸

the Congress building. The announcement came at seven·m
thirty 1n the ev
the Tribunal of Honor delivered its
Alessandri.

The official notification

sent to the representatives of the National Union and the
Liberal Alliance read as follows:
I have the honor to communicate to you
that the Tribunal of Arbitration , after
having studied the different clain며 s presented in regard to the presidential election , has reached a decision that SeRor
Alessandri received 17l_votes and Senor

October

斷聊빼

u-D mo
,l 9

잉밍
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p. 262; nSF. 825.00/176 ’ Shea to Colby ,
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Barros Borgono 176. One elector in
Cachapoal , who cast his vote for
Barros , was not considered. Therefore
the Tr ibunal approved , acc.ording to
Article 8 of the basis of its organization the following decision: Senor
Alessandri , having received the majority of votes , according ~o the claims
presented , has the best right to be
considered elected.
(signed) Luis Barriga , President of
the Tribunal ..
Ramon Gutierrez A.~ Secretary.
The final vote of the seven members of the court gave five
votes toAlessandri and two to Barros.1 35
The news of the results brought jubilation to the
ranks of the.Liberal Alliance and gloom to the adherents of
the National Union.

The bitter recriminations against

Guillermo Subercaseaux resulted in his eventual resignation
as president of the National Party.

The Congress met in

joint session on October 6 , and (under the provisions of the
Constitution and of those that were agreed upon in the Act
of the constitution of the Tribunal) it proceeded to elect
Alessandri President of the

Republic.

Senator Gonzalo

Bu1nes--on behalf of the Unionistas--made the first speech ,
stating in part:

•

• the National Union must fu~fill the
painful duty of concurring in the proclamation of the candidate as President which we
opposed in the campaign; however~ we submit
to this duty because it is an obligation
~~~.9~q~d .. by our con~ 1= itution ... The. Lib~ral

135뻗뀐 ￥맨￥ Times , October 2 , 1920 , 17:3; 앨말. 825.00/
176 , Shea~ Colby , October 1 , 1920 , translated b뚱-the Embassy
staff.
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Union fulfills this duty in order t 。
redeem the political pledge it took
(to abide by the decision of the
Tribunal of Honor) though in doing so
it is necessary to repress many justified prot~~ts~ I do not wish to open
a dabate 갈 i 당 on the question; but I
repeat that our silence is a great
sacrifice. The National Union asks
all its members to give to Senor
Alessandri the necessary votes which
will proclaim him constitutionally
elected. At the same time the National
Union prays that God may guard the destinies of the nation , that our fears may
not be realized , that our country may
continue on the road of liberty and
progress and that our future~~~ybe
worthy of our glorious past. 136
A short debate followed Bulnes ’ address and then the vote
was taken; eighty-seven ballots were case for Alessandri and
twenty-nine were case in blank. 137

Vice-President Ovalle

then declared that Arturo Alessandri had been elected
President of the Republic for the period beginning
De cember

23 , 1920 and ending December 23 , 1925.
Following the brief session of the Congress , the

President-Elect issued a proclamation in which he promised
to respect electoral liberty , maintain the parliamentary
regime , and search for harmonious solutions to the conflicts
between capital and labor.
DOI) Qs c;>,

끼 that.h~would.~o~ ‘ get.as.~apldlyas.the.frivolity

136....
，..~
Cited in DS~.
825.00/177 , Shea to Colby , October 15 ,
translated by-the Embassy staff.
137 Donoso , p. 263.
-!'.

1920 ,

"Hollow and vain words ,tT wrote

..

-!'

.....
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with which he had pronounced them!u138
The Cabinet presented its resignation; however , the
Alianza had no interest in assuming power at that moment ,
so it requested that the Ministry continue to function
until the expiration of Sanfuentes ’ term.

Editorials in

most of the leading papers commented favorably on the
decision of the Tribunal , there was a noticeable easing
of tensions throughout Chile , and both political combinations appeared relieved that the possibility of revolution
and widespread disorders had been averted , at least
rarily.139
place on

tempo~

The transmission of presidential power took

De cember

23 amidst tremendous popular enthusiasm

for the new chief executive:

at last the people had their

There were many , though , who pre-

candidate in power.

dieted that Alessandri would find it very difficult to
carry out his sweeping promises to the working classes in
the face of formidable congressional opposition.
•

From the

most pessimistic vantage point:
Now we have the agitator in La Moneda
disguised as ruler;in the exercise of
his duties he will apply the same methods
used during his entire political life , he
will stir up the masses , talk without letup , issue manifestos , write letters--to
fO J;Q1. ~. dense. co J,.1,l mn. o:f. smoke. hiO i. ng. the
138 onoso , p. 26μ. The text of the proclamation_is
included in the Appendixes.
l39nn
n
펀프. 825.00/177 , Shea to Colby , October 15 , 1920.
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CONCLUSION

The crisis of 1920 was not simply an electoral problem.

Something deeper and more fundamental was involved;

the passive obedience of the Chilean masses to the oligarchy
had disappeared.

For the first time a presidential candidate

had stumped thecountry to address the forgotten proletariat ,
and by means of his oratorical talents and his great personal
magnetism , Alessandri had drawn the
cause.

w~rking

classes to his

They did not stop to question his sincerity or to

consider the tremendous obstacles standing in the way of
profound social change.

Eduardo Frei viewed the situation

as "a great moment for the rise of'a caudillo who would
awaken a mystique and would express the vague aspirations
that stirred the masses."lμl
The presidential election had divided the country ,
as always , into two bands that would fight each other to
the death , but the contest of 1920 saw new factors enter
the struggle.

While on other occasions political interest

centered in the directing classes , this time the election
brought up social and economic conflict which greatly
af~~ct~cl. the

141
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proletariat.•. The ALianza. candidate cl.io not
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Edwards and Frei , p.
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create the issues for his own political purposes , but he
was clever enough to unite all the elements of agitation ,
dissatisfaction , and latent revolt which had been accumulating for years andwhich finally rose to the surface
after Wqrld War I.

The ruling classes , the

traditi。 nal

conservative elements of Chilean society , committed an
irreparable error by ignoring this discontent and attributing it to artificial agitation.
that the agitators used

막혈

They failed to see

legitimate causes for unrest

and manipulated those causes for their own purposes.
Alessandri promised to remedy all the ills which
plagued the workers:

to solve all the problems which had

frustrated for more than twenty years such capable
reformer"s as Social ist labor leader Luis Recabarren.

Yet

while the poverty-stricken masses rallied around their
messiah with an enthusiasm bordering on the fanatic , they
did not elect him.

Since most were illiterate and thus

denied the right to vote ， lμ2 Alessandri ·needed the support
。f

the middle sectors in order to reach the La Moneda.

That support at the ballot box brought him victory.

There

was little in the early career of the Lion to indicate he
woul Cl. b~co ll1e

th~. ch~mpion.

of. the.

oown~t:roOOen: ...

be. waa aa

lμ2

Scarcely more than 8% of the population cast
~ballots in th~pres~dentia1 election of 1920.
E1 뾰rc뾰초으，
November 3 , 1925 , cited by Pike , p. 172.
--
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dedicated to preserving the status quo as most of his colleagues in the lower Chamber.

After 1915 , he did learn

first hand of the terrible plight of the workers in the
North , and he developed a mild sociaL conscience.

He

probably was sincere in wanting to alleviate the suffering
of the lower classes , but he also recognized that limited
social legislation was vital to the preservation of order
in the Republic.
。wn

Moreover , he sincerely believed in his

destiny; his ambition often overrode his convictions.
The decision of the Tribunal of Honor was accepted

by the National Union because the likely alternative was
revolution.

Besides , Alessandri"did not pose a grave

threat to the ruling clique , for he could not command

~

dependable majority coalition in Congress to pass any
sweeping reform legislation.

Nor did he even propose

drastic changes in the form of government.

The record

does not support the contention of most Latin Americanists
(authors of general works on Latin American and Chile) that
Alessandri openly advocated in 1920 the
parliamentary system.
vaguely:

of the

He advocated only what others stated

that the presidential powers

expanded or strengthened , and that the
enjoy more autonomy.

abo~효 tion

However , in

192니，

shaul뼈

be somehow

provi뼈 ces

should

after more than

three frustrating years of doing battle with a recalcitrant
Congress , he doubtless became convinced that the parliamentary
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system was indeed unworkable.

In sum , the year 1920 signaled the open1ng

。f

a

new era in which the traditional political climate 1n Chile
was markedly modified by the acknowledgment that an explosive social situation existed 1n the country.

•
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Alessandri Palma--hero of the masses , saV1or ,

Arturo

---‘ + •
R
>

L

demagogue , destroyer--became the transitional figure who
was instrumental 1n bringing about the creation of a new ,
more democratic Chile.

,

A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Although much has been written about the parliamentary
period in Chilean history (1891-1920) , there is a dearth of
available material concerning the early career of Arturo
Alessandri and his struggle to obtain the presidency.

The

mostvaluable source in English consists of the Records
the Department of State Relating to
으효

Chile , 1910-1929 .

효프르

The reports of the

are of limited usefulness.

으효

Internal Affairs
뾰포 효뾰 띤뾰프

Also informative , though not

available in translation , are Alessandri's writings including Revoluci6n 뾰 뾰완:

판

and particularly Recuerdos

actuacion (Santiago , 1950)

뾰 gobiern。

:

효브띤 inistraci6n

1920-1925 (Santiago , 1952) , the first of a projected twovolume set of memoirs that Alessandri did not live to complete.

/

Artur‘。 Olavarria

Bravo , who became the senator ’ s

. private secretary early in the presidential campaign , has
written a four-volume history of recent Chilean politics
entitled Chile entre dos Alessandri:

Memorias pol{ticas

(Santiago , 1962-1965) , and his first volume devotes a
brief section to Alessandri ’ s election and early years of
administration.
Outstanding among the secondary sources is the
definitive two-volume biography by the noted Chilean

‘’‘”’5“‘’”‘g“---영'WIInIn!'~’‘-앤뭘-커!’
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historian Ricardo Donoso , A1essandri ,

agitado갇

x demoledor:

Cincuenta arios 브로 historia po1{tica 브트 Chile (Mexico , 1952 ,
195μ).

Though constituting a bitter denunciation of

Alessandri--which his family attempted to suppress--the work
was thoroughly researched and carefully documented.

In con-

trast , a very sympathetic biography is Augusto Iglesias ,
Alessandri ,

브므브

etapa

뾰 L효

democracia

르므

America (Santiago ,

1960) , a rather mediocre effort that lacks documentation.
Fora brief , somewhat superficial appraisal of Alessandri ,
there is a chapter dealing with his career in Robert J.
Alexander , Prophets

프 프뾰

Revolution (New York , 1962).

Other general works which ·contribute to an understanding of Chilean politics of the era are Alberto Edwards
Vives , 월 fronda aristocratica:

Historia pol{tica 뾰 E판릎

(Santiago , 1959) , a classic now in its fifth edition; and
Alberto Edwards.Vives and Eduardo Frei Montalva , Historia
브흐 죠으효

particlos politicos chilenos (Santiago ,
/

Galdames ,

프

History

으효

19μ9).

Chile (2nd ed.; New York ,

Luis

196μ) ，

in

English translation , relates the history of the country from
conquestto the second World War , and Fredrick B. Pike , Chile
웰브 뾰르

United States , 1880-1962:

Social Crisis·

효뾰 E뾰

Challenge

E으

로브E

Emergence

으E

Chile ’ S

UnitedStates Diplomacy

(Notre Dame , 1963) presents an excellent detailed study of
the recent national period , covering both domestic developments and foreign affairs.

The best analysis of the Chilean
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party system is

뀐뜯

Political System

G.Gil.(Boston , 1966).
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Chile by Federico

APPENDIX I
THE AGREEMENT TO FORM THE TRIBUNAL OF HONOR
The powers and formation of the.Tribunal of Honor
areset forth in the pact signed by the candidates and
representatives of the Liberal Alliance and National Union
as follows:
I . T h e representatives of the National Union
and the Liberal Alliance agree to submit , to a
court of arbiters , the protests which havebeen
formulated against the election of presidential
electors who voted or should have voted on
July 25 , 1920.
II.
The Tribunal will be composed of Fernando
Lazcano , President of the Senate; Ramon Briones
Luco , President of the Chamber of Deputies;
Ismael Tocornal; Emiliano Figueroa; Luis Barriga;
Armando Quezada and Guillermo Subercaseaux. If
any of the persons forming the Tribunal are unable
to serve the other arbiters will , by unanimous
agreement , appoint substitutes.
III.
The Tribunal will consider the electoral
claims in accordance with the Electoral Law; it
will have full power as a jury toconsider all
evidence submitted and it will also render decisions on disputes which may be outside the province of the electoral law. All protests not
accepted by the Tribunal will be eonsidered as
rejected.
IV.
The Tribunal will have power to add electors if , by the protest submitted , it should appear
that the eliminated elector belonged to the opposite
politicalgroup. When an electoral fraud does not
clearly justify the additionof an elector , the
Tribunal will only eliminate the elector whose election is , in the opinion of the Tribunal , illegal.

쉰F얀생잇
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v.

The Tribunal will consider the votes of
those electors who. , for any reason , did not vote
on July 25 , 1920; and will re-establish any alteration which may have taken place in the votes cast
by the electors after that date - this being done
without prejudice to the protests made which refer
to the election of such electors. The Tribunal
will adopt for the study of the contested election ,
the following basis:
On June 25 , 1920 , 179 electors voted for
Arturo Alessandri and 174 voted for Barros Borgono:
and that , according to the previous paragraph , the
elector , Pastor Infante , who could not vote , would
have voted for Borgono.
VI.
The Tribunal ’ s decision will be rendered by
an absolute majority of the total number of members
forming the Tribunal.
VII.
The main purposes of the National Union and
theLiberal Alliance are that the arbiters shall
decide all claims regarding the election of presidential electors , and that as soon as all the claims
are decided , they shall declare which of the tw。
candidates for the presidency of the Republic has
been elected in accordance with the resolutions
adopted by the Tribunal.
VIII. If neither of the two candidates obtains an
absolute majority of electors , the Tribunal will
declare which would have been elected if certain
acts had not taken place altering the legitimate
result of the election , - no matter what may be the
number of votes to which the candidates are reduced.
IX.
If the result of the election , after all
claims have been decided upon by the Tribunal ,
should give an equal number of votes toboth candidates , or if the Tribunal should decide that both
have equal rights , then Congress wi l. l freely elect
the President of the Republic from the two candidates.

x.

The representatives of the National Union
and the Liberal Alliance agree to this pact , moved
them to the highest sentiments of justice and social
。rder and desirous of maintaining the welfare of the
Republic; and they sign it with faitb that their
respective friends in the National αongress will

100
follow thedecisions of the arbitration Tribunal when the time comes for Congress ,
according to the Constitution , to elect the
President of the Republic.
Translated by the Embassy staff
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APPENDIX II
ALESSANDRI ’ S PROCLAMATION
"Ireiterate my steady purpose of exerting
frommy post of President of the Republic
every legitimate influence in favor of the program of workwhich I presented to the country
during my campaign.
"As President I will pay strict observance
to electoral liberty and will grant it amply
and without limitations. I will respect the
parliamentary system , seeking a close accord
andharmony between the Executive and Congress ,
as only with the mutual agreement of these two
powers of the State efficient Government action
is possible.
"During all my public life I have worked for
electoral liberty and for the respect of the
parliamentary system. I have always condemned
the men who , once elected , contradict with their
acts what they established in their programs. I
have the firm determination of not falling into
such an error; and my most constant effort will
be to obtain , when I abandon the high post to
which I have been elected , the public recognition
of my countrymen that I know how to prove with
acts whAt I maintained and preached.
!’The stabilization ofour money is an imperious
necessity which does not admit of further delays.
This problem must be met and solved with the patriotic energy required by a question of such wide
proportions and of such supreme importance from
the financial , economical and social point of
view.
"The social problems must be solved within a
spirit of solidarity and justice , always trying
to obtain the harmony between capital and labor ,
the only efficacious means to obtain all the
efficiency of these two great factors of the
economical progress of peoples.
"Capital must be respected and protected in
its ri흠 hts; but to labor must be given also its
part of protection and justice. I have the
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deepest conviction that the maintenance of
social peace and order - supreme aspiration
of all governing forces - are .solidly supported only upon the basis of strict justice
and of equal rights for all.
HI have , then , the absolute certainty that
during my Presidency there will be ample and
sincere electoral liberty; respect of parliamentary system; stabilization of money; and
as to social problems , solidarity and justice ,
wi thin .the harmony which must exist between
capital and labor.
"These are my ideas and my convictions and
they represent the sacred pledgeI have contracted with the country , because they sum up
what I have expressed from town to town and
from village to village of the Repub호 ic during
thelong democratic crusadewhich I started at
the beginning of the political campaign which
destiny crowned with success for the satisfaction of all those that see in this victory the
beginning of an epoch ofwelfare and prosperity
for our country.'.'
Translated by the Embassy Staff

